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Colin Clark's theory of inflation has had a profound effect on 
present-day economic theory concerning taxation policy. While his belief 
that inflation occurred when all tax revenues exceeded 25 percent of 
national income was rejected by his contemporaries in the 1940's, supply­
side economists incorporate Clark's theory into their proposals for 
curing the unemployment and inflation of the 1970's and 1980's. These 
proposals gained popular support and resulted in the election of President 
Ronald Reagan who implemented such proposals. The purpose of this study 
is to determine the veracity of Clark's theory. 
Clark's theory was tested in this study with the use of regres­
sion analysis. The dependent variable, inflation, was measured as the 
percent change in the consumer price index. The consumer price index 
was chosen because it is a broad-based index that is representative of 
commodity and service prices and excludes labor costs. Measurement error 
was minimized by the use of annual CPI data. The independent variable is 
the ratio of total tax receipts as a percent of the officially reported 
national income. The preliminary run of the test was performed on the 
United States from 1941-1981 using ordinary least squares contained in 
the Econometric Software Package. Autocorrelation appeared in the 
regression and attempts to correct this failed. 
The modified test model used the rate of inflation acceleration 
(percent change in the inflation rate) as the dependent variable. This 
dependent variable exaggerates the magnitude of price changes, making the 
relationship more likely. The independent variable represented the 
elasticity coefficient of total tax receipts to national income (percent 
change in taxes divided by percent change in national income, expressed 
as a percentage). This independent variable is far more descriptive of 
the interaction between tax revenues and national income. The model was 
used to test Clark's theory in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States from 1963-1981. 
The regression results show that there is no relationship between the 
rate of inflation acceleration and the elasticity of total tax receipts 
and national income. 
On the basis of the regression analysis and the country by country 
statistical analysis, this study finds little evidence to support Clark's 
theory of inflation. For this reason, the study reconnnends a re-examina­
tion of all policies that have been implemented on the basis of Clark's 
theory or other similar theories of inflation. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ineffectiveness of government policy in curing inflation and 
unemployment in the 1970's prompted a few economists to revise their 
theories regarding fiscal measures, especially taxation policy. These 
revisionists, who are known as supply-side economists, feel high rates 
of taxation on income reduce the work effort of employees, thereby 
causing distortions in both the input and output markets. Decreased 
work effort by labor makes the costs of production increase and is trans­
mitted as higher prices for final goods. In the input markets, employers 
attempt to substitute capital for labor; causing a decrease in the demand 
for labor (resulting in unemployment) and an increase in the demand for 
capital goods. The higher demand for capital goods increases the demand 
for loanable funds to purchase the capital goods; the increased demand 
for funds results in higher interest rates. This new level of 
interest rates increases the interest payments on the deficit of the 
federal government, necessitating further increases in tax revenues to 
meet those payments. Without an impetus for change, this sequence becomes 
self-perpetuating, resulting in increasing levels of unemployment and 
inflation. While traditional theory calls for tax increases to reduce 
aggregate demand and alleviate upward pressure on prices, supply-side 
economists advocate tax cuts in order to increase aggregate supply and 
thus apply downward pressure on prices. 
1 
2 
While many of the supply-side foundations can be traced back to 
the writings of Adam Smith, 1 much of the recent popularization of supply -
side analysis can be attributed to Colin Clark, a mid-twentieth century 
Australian economist. Clark's theory, first presented in the Economic 
Journal, December 1945;;, 2 describes how government budgetary deficits and 
taxation as a percent of income is the cause of inflation. In this article, 
Clark does not indicate whether taxes or deficits are the real cause of 
inflation. However, his later article, "The Danger Point in Taxes, " pub­
lished in Harper's nagazine, December 1950,
3 
clearly presents the hypo-
thesis which gained Clark considerable notoriety. 
In the second article, Clark stated that if the levels of taxation 
are too high, people will lose their incentive to engage in activities that 
further increase their incomes. Consequently, the quantity of goods pro-
duced (supplied) does not grow as rapidly as demand, and price increases 
result. Clark's statistical analysis led him to conclude that inflation 
will occur when tax revenues exceed 25 percent of national income during 
peace time in non-totalitarian countries. Clark describes the sequence 
of events as follows: 
We have learned, f rom the experience of many 
countries what happens when taxes mount too 
high. Many people don't find it worth their 
1
Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Weal th 
of Nations, Max Learner, ed. (New York, NY: Random House, Inc., 1937), 
see Ch. 2 of Book 2 and Book 5 for a complete discussion of the relation­
ship between sovereign revenues and the productivity of workers. 
2colin Clark, "Public Finance and Changes 
Economic Journal, Vol. LV, No. 220 (New York, NY: 
1945), pp. 371-389. 
in the Value of Honey," 
Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
3colin Clark, "The Danger Point in Taxes, " Harper 's Magazine, Vol. 
201, No. 1207 (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1950). 
pp. 67-69. 
while to work hard and efficiently. Produc­
tion doesn't expand as fast as it should. 
There is a shortage of goods4 followed by an inflationary rise in prices. 
The disagreement among economists about Clark's theory did not 
stem from his postulation that a taxable limit existed. To some econo-
mists, like Francis Bator, the idea of extremely high .levels of taxation 
3 
having negative effects on an economy was not new. Bator speculated that 
if Clark had specified a much higher figure, there would have been little 
controversy over his thoery; many Western nations had exceeded Clark's 
25 percent limit for most of the post-World War II decade without apparent 
damage to their economies. Bator's concern was that the 25 percent figure 
would be used as a universal policy guide for governments.
5 
Other econo-
mists, such as Monteath Douglas, feared Clark's analysis would provide 
the basis for legal restrictions on the budgetary powers of government. 
As Douglas observes: 
When economists in England a generation ago 
were interesting themselves in the subject of 
taxable capacity the circumstances of time and 
the method of their inquiry caused them to give 
forth a subdued and uncertain sound to which the 
public paid no attention. But when in recent 
years Mr. Clark's warning hit the newspapers, 
many people who had not previously paid much 
attention to the views of economists about 
anything received it as a revelation and a 
dogma binding the conscience of the citizen 
and the conduct of his government. 6 
4
Ibid. , pp. 67-69. 
5
Francis Bator, "Inflation, "  The Question of Governrr1ent Spending 
--Public Needs and Private Wants (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1960 ), 
p. so. 
6
Monteath Douglas, "Taxable Capacity and the British 'and Canadian 
Experience, " The Limits of Taxable Capacity, presented at the National Tax 
Institute Symposium, Nov. 20-21, 195 2 (Princeton, NJ: Tax Institute, 1953),
p. 30. 
The fears of these economists were not unfounded. Twenty-nine states 
sent petitions to the United States Congress requesting a constitutional 
peace-time limit of 25 percent of national income for estate and income 
tax revenues as a result of Clark's thesis.
7 
4 
The taxable limit put forth by Clark had a profound effect on the 
development of economic theory. Clark's methodology and conclusions pro­
vided the framework for the writings of Jude Wanniski,
8 
Arthur Laffer,
9 
. and Craig Roberts. l
O 
These latter writings were the basis of the Kemp­
Roth tax cut proposals
11 
and the popularization of the current supply­
side theory. 
12 
Supply-side theory gained the support of much of the 
American public and resulted in the election of a U. S. President (J1r, 
Ronald Rea�an) who promised to implement such proposals. 
7
wall Street Journal, Aug. 13, 195 2. Only seventeen petitions 
were sent out of the House Judiciary Committee to the House floor for 
consideration. For more information see, Constitutional Limitation on 
Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Rates, Joint Economic Connnittee, 
86th Congress (Washington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office), 
p. 26. 
8
see Jude Wanniski, The Way the World Works (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, Inc. ,  1978). 
9
Arthur Laffer, The Economics of the Tax Revolt (New York, NY: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1979). 
lO
Since Paul Craig Roberts is a guest writer for the Wall Street 
Journal, he has many published writings. Craig Roberts, "The Case for 
Kemp-Roth, " Wall Street Journal, Aug. 1, 1978, p. 26, clearly shows 
Clark's influence. 
11
The Kemp-Roth tax proposal calls for a 10-10-10 red uction of 
personal income taxes. While the Kemp-Roth proposal was never enacted, 
the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (ERA) included a very similar proposal, 
except the ERA cut taxes only 5 percent the first y ear. 
before 
D. C. : 
12
otto Eckstein, Forecasting the Supply Side of the Econom�, Hearings 
the Joint Economic Committee, 96th Congress, May 21, 1980 (Washington, 
U. S. Government Printing Office), p. 26. 
 
The influence of Clark's writings can be seen in the Reagan 
Administration':s economic plan. Clark's taxable limit provided the 
foundations for the tax changes implemented by this administration. 
As Budget Director David Stockman states: 
tax receipts under current law would rise 
by 14 percent annually from 1981 to 1986, and by 
1986 the share of GNP taken by taxes would rise 
to over 24 percent. Such large increases stemming 
from continued bracket creep and inadequate depre­
ciation would have a debilitating effect on growth, 
savings, entrepreneurial activity and work effort. 
This tax break effect generates continued economic 
stagnation, higher unemployment, and declining 
living standards. By contrast, the proposed tax 
rate reductions and the more rapid writeoffs of 
plant and equipment costs will contirbute new 
incentives for strong growth rates of investmen� 
production and real income. Under the President's 
plan, the share of worker incomes and industry 
profits taken by Government will fall to 20.4 
percent of GNP in 1982, and to about 19. S percent 
in subsequent years.13 
5 
However, the anticipated effects of the Reagan economic plan have 
yet to occur. More than a year after the implementation of this policy, 
the U.S. economy has experienced record levels of unemployment and a 
prolonged recession. While current price increases have moderated 
due to the recession, forecasts by some of the most prestigious fore-
casting firms indicate inflation will be more severe in the future than 
in the past. Dr. Robert Gough, Jr. , of Data Resoruce, Inc., concludes 
from his analysis of the Reagan economic program: 
13
navid Stockman, President Reagan's Economic Program. Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on the Budget, 97th Congres s, Feb. 19, 1981 
(Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 9. 
On a net basis, one cannot escape this conclusion 
if one believes in the relationships that have 
governed the economy in the past, that the net 
effect of the President's program, • • •  is to 
make the inflation rate worse.14 
6 
The reason the rate of inflation would become worse is because a 
tax cut would increase disposable income and provide consumers with greater 
purchasing power. This led Dr. Gough to conclude that the Reagan tax cut 
would add fuel to current inflationary pressures. 
It is important to investigate the validity of Clark's analysis 
because of its impact on current policy. The purpose of this inquiry is 
to determine if inflation occurs when tax revenues exceed 2 5  pereent of 
National Income. A review of Clark's method and dat a is necessary in 
order to develop a model for testing his hypothesis. From this analysis, 
it will be possible to evaluate the veracity of Clark's conclusions. 
14nr. Robert Gough, Jr., Economic Forecasts. Hearings before the 
Joint Economic Committee, 97th Congress, March 12 , 1981 (U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1981), p. 42. 
CHAPTER II 
COMMENTARIES ON CLARK 
Pre-CLark Theories on a Taxable Limit 
Although the concept of a taxable limit has been debated since 
the first comprehensive tax system, the first cognizant theory of a tax-
able limit was not formed until the late nineteenth century. During this 
period, the British Parliament was attempting to determine the maximum 
rental tax which could be imposed on Ireland without serious harm to 
Irish agricultural productivity and political stability. A British 
economist of this period, Charles Francis Bastable, estimated that any 
form of taxation that exceeded 15 percent of Irish national agricultural 
income would have severe ramifications for Ireland's economic and poli-
tical stability. However, this was based more on Bastable's impression 
of the Irish temperament rather than solid scientific analysis. 
1 
Shortly after the First World War, discussion by the British Par-
liament about war debt repayment prompted Sir Josiah Stamp to investigate 
the limits to which a nation could be taxed. Stamp postulated that factors 
such as the use of tax revenues, the "spirit and the national psychology" 
toward taxation, population growth, the distribution of income and wealth, 
the type of tax imposed, and the progressivity of the tax were the deciding 
factors of a nation's taxable limit. Within this framework, Stamp concluded 
1
Francis Bator, The Question of Government Spending--Public Needs 
and Private Wants (New York, NY: Harper and Bros,, 1960), p. 50. 
7 
8 
that taxation policy in Great Britain from 1860 to 1914 had thwarted new 
business investment, particularly when a preponderance of the revenue went 
to debt payment. Stamp observes: 
A man may be unaffected in his efforts, so far as 
they at present exist • • • but every new effort 
and every new responsibility will come under taxa­
tion of a drastic kind, and makes the reward far 
less attractive • • •  Their new business enterprise 
or saving is taxed to pay tribute for the past absti­
nence of others. The prizes of successful enterprise 
and risk taking are seriously reduced, and the dead 
hand of
.
debt2stretches out over the zeal of future 
generations. 
Because of this reasoning, Stamp opposed A. C. Pigou's schedule 
for British debt retirement,
3 
and favored instead a scheme of taxes called 
the Rigano Scheme of Death Duties. The Rigano Scheme taxed second and 
third generation inheritances, but allowed first generation inheritances 
to pass free from taxes. Thus, work incentives of the current generation 
of workers could be maintained and the necessary revenue for debt repayment 
would be obtained. 
2
Sir Josiah Stamp, Wealth and Taxable Capacity (London, UK: P. S. 
King and Sons, Ltd. , 1922), pp. 171-172. 
3
Ibid. , p. 180. Pigou assumed that (1) National Income would be 3 
trillion pounds, (2) productivity and debt interest growth rates would remain 
equal, (3) no change in the price of inputs, (4) the size of the government 
budget would not change substantially. A capital levy could reduce the 
aggregate tax burden funded by general revenues as follows: 
% of 
Levy on Needed General Revenue for National 
Capital Interest Payment on the Debt Income 
---
No Levy. . . . . . . . . . . 800 million pounds. . . . . . . . . 27% 
Half of debt funded 
by a capital levy. . . . .560 million pounds. . . . . . . . . 25% 
All of debt funded 
by a capital levy. . . . . 320 million pounds. . . . . . . . . 12% 
Stamp found consensus in the New Fabian Research Bureau. A 
Socialist Budget, a Fabian pamphlet, concluded that the Rigano Scheme 
could raise taxation from 23.4 percent of National Income to 25 percent 
of National Income without substantial price increases. The pamphlet 
9 
stated that price increases would not result from the Rigano Scheme because 
work and investment incentives would be maintained for the current genera-
tion of workers, thereby ensuring adequate business investment to provide 
for goods and services in the market. The principle author of this pam­
phlet was an obscure Australian economist, Colin Clark.
4 
Clark's Determination of Inflation 
Clark's purpose was to find the causes of inflation in times of 
peace in non-totalitarian countries. In the initial presentation of Clark's 
theory, he delineates two predominant factors which were generally considered
by economists to cause inflation: external currency depreciation by foreign 
bankers and/or governments, and wage increases. He believed that these were 
only mechanisms by which inflation was transmitted to the private sector; 
government actions, particularly taxation, are the primary inflationary 
sources. From statistical analysis, Clark believed the inflationary pres-
sures on the two mechanisms became significant when tax revenues exceeded 
25 percent of National Income. 
The consideration of external depreciation is dated for this ana-
lysis, but worthy of mention to understand Clark's data adjustments on 
domestic prices. During Clark's writings, international exchange was 
4
Ironically, many of the co-authors of the pamphlet speaking out 
against Pigou's proposal, like Joan Robinson and G. F. Shove, were Pigou's 
students. "Public Finance and Changes in the Value of Money," Economic 
Journal, Dec. 1945 (New York, NY: Macmillan and Co. , Ltd.), pp. 380-381. 
10 
regulated under the terms of the Bretton Woods Agreement. This system 
assigned currencies fixed par values and these values were maintained by 
official intervention in the currency markets. Hence governments were 
able to minimize the effect of international markets on the domestic 
supply of money, making domestic monetary policy more accurate. However, 
to maintain the balance of trade (goods to goods relationship) the level 
of prices had to rise or fall, depending on whether a surplus or deficit 
occurred in the countries' current accounts.
5 
Even in countries where the 
foreign trade sector composed a small segment of Gross National Product, 
these price adjustments occurred to maintain the balance of trade. Thus 
the foreign sector determined a larger role in domestic price fluctuations. 
In fact, it was this feature of the Bretton Woods System that contributed 
to its demise in the early 1970 's. 6 
5
clark also fails to consider the role of the central bank in the 
transmission process. In a fiat reserve system such as the United States, 
the Federal Reserve is not obligated to respond to international current 
account deficits or surpluses. Historically, there has been little rela­
tionship between the international markets and U. S. domestic price levels. 
See William Gale, Inflation, Causes and Consequences and Control (Cambridge: 
MA: Oeleshlager, Gunn, and Hain, Publishers, Inc. , 1981), pp. 115 -131. 
6
nue to a $9. 8 billion overseas current account deficit of the U. S., 
President Nixon suspended American participation in the Bretton Woods System 
and instituted a domestic wage and price freeze. Other nations who had their 
currency tied to the American dollar or who were close trading partners of 
the U. S. then left the system, allowing their currencies to float freely. 
Temporary dollar parities were established under the Smithsonian Agreement, 
but these countries abandoned the temporary parities by 1973. The demise 
of the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970 's removed currency exchange 
rates from the international currency markets. Under the new float system, 
domestic prices can remain stable, while international currency values 
fluctuate to accommodate activity in that market. Therefore, this variable 
is omitted f rom the model developed later in this paper. Wilfred Ethier, 
Modern International Economics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co. , Inc . ,  
1983), pp. 459-461. Also see C. A. r.oorobs, The Arena of International 
Finance (New York, NY: John Wiley Co. , 1976). 
1 1  
The s econd transmi s s ion mechanism to  w
hi ch Clark refers , wage 
increases , o c curs in two ways : either t
hrough the c o rporate  wage res is t­
anc e  e f f ec t  o r  through the work-leisur e  
sub s t i tut ion e f f ec t . The wage 
resis tance ef fect  o c curs when co rpo rat i
ons are s ubjec t  to excess pro f i t s  
t axes and/o r very progre s s ive c o rporate  
income taxes . I n  Clark ' s  view , 
corpora tions are incl ined to  grant wag
e conces s ions t o  employees that are 
grea t er than their inc reas es in produc t
ivity in order t o  infla t e  costs. 
By inflat ing produc t ion cos t s , the f i rm 
is able to  reduce i t s  taxab le 
income and therefore reduce i ts tax lia
b ility. These inf lated c o s t s  are 
p as s ed on to  the consumer , increas ing 
the level o f output pri ces . 
However ,  this argument ha s two imp li c i
t  assump t ions. F i rs t ,  i t  
a s s umes corporations favor increas e s  i n
 labo r c o s t s  over o ther c o s t s. The 
co rporation may no t be inclined to fav
or wage inc reas es, especially if 
they tend to reduce corpora t e  cont ro l 
over future wage in creases (e.g . ,  
union contract s ) . Secondly , i f  the c o
rporat ion i s  limi ted t o  lab o r  inten­
s ive produc t ion techniques , the number
 o f  employee s will be  great er. Thus , 
the firm ' s increased tax liability may
 p rove less  cos t ly than suc cessive 
wage increases , leaving lit tle inc ent
ive to inf l a t e  c o s t s  through wage 
increases. 
There are o ther me tho ds the f i rm coul
d use to reduce its taxab le  
income: increas ing maint enance and a
dve r t i s ing co s t s , inc reasing the 
p ayout ratio to sto ckho lders , increas
ing execut ive expens e accounts , etc . 
However , if there are high leve ls o f  
tax revenues leaving the corporate 
t reasury , each and every dollar remain
ing out of corporate retained earnings
 
is es pecia l ly impo rtant, and the corp
ora tion is no t likely to spend money 
on these items unles s they yie l d  a sub
s tantial rate of return . If thes e 
12 
monies are spent  wa s te ful ly, ine f f i c ient bus ines s p ract ices  may result, 
contribut ing to  further declines in the d iminished p ro f i t  margins of the 
firm.  Th erefore , i t  is no t l ikely that c orporat ions will be encouraged 
to inflate c o s t s , unless taxat ion be comes extreme .
7 
Even if the argument 
was valid , C lark does no t p rovide reasons why this e f f e c t  b e c omes s i gni-
fican t  when tax revenues exceed 2 5 percent of Nat iona l Inc ome . 
The work-leisure substi tution argument  p res ented  by Clark is more 
intere s t ing . As presented in the f irs t chap t er, Clark feels that ind ivi-
duals are less inc lined to inc rease the ir  produc tivi ty and work e f fort  
under high rates o f  taxa tion , there f o re , people  t end t o  favor mo re leis ure 
rather than t ime spent increas ing th eir level of income . C lark pos tula ted 
that this e f fec t is predominant among members of a soci ety when tax 
revenues exceed 2 5 percent o f  Nat ional Inc ome . 
\. The wo rk- leisure e f f e c t  has been debated for  many years . S ome 
economi s t s  be lieve that taxes may cause individuals t o  wo rk harder to com-
pensat e for their  loss o f  inc ome , especially a t  the lower end o f  the s cale . 8 
Other economi s t s  feel non-economi c mo t ives , such as power , p res t ige and 
wo rker p ride , p lay a more important role  in the act ions of indivi duals than 
do t axes . Thoma s S aunders ' series  o f  int erviews with busines smen conc luded 
that tax ra t es have l i t t le or no e f fect  on the work e f fort of bus ines smen; 
o ther mo t ives , such as power within the organi zat io n , are more impo rtant .
9 
7
Jos eph Pechman and Thomas Mayo r , "Mr . Cla rk on the Limi ts of Taxa­
t i on , "  Review o f  Economi cs and S ta tis t ics (Cambrid ge , MA: Ha rvard University 
Press , 19 5 2 ) , p .  240 . 
8
Francis Bator, op . cit . ,  pp. 52-54 . 
9
Thomas Saunders, E f fects o f  Taxat ion on Inc ent ives o f  Executives 
( Cambridge , MA: Harva rd Un ive rsity Pres s , 1951) , espe cia l ly the las t  chap t er. 
 
Rec ent s ta t i s t ical research cont rad ic t s  S aunders ' work . Chris-
13 
topher Frenze , s t a f f  economi s t  for  the Jo int Economic Commit tee , found 
that the Revenue Ac ts  of 1 9 2 1 ,  1 9 2 4 , 1 9 26 and 1 9 6 4
1 0  
r emoved worker d is-
inc ent ives and expanded output. Frenze  conc luded that the results o f  the 
1 9 2 1 Revenue Ac t caused unemp loyment to decline and p roduc tivi ty to 
increas e .  The 1 9 2 4 Revenue Ac t caus ed unemployment rates to drop 2 7 . 3  
percent and indus t rial p roduc tivi ty t o  expand by 1 2  p er c ent. The 1 9 2 6  
Revenue Ac t caus ed a 50 percent reduct ion i n  the unemp loyment r a t e  and 
an expans ion in output per man hour over the two years fo llowing the tax 
cut . 
1 1  
Lawrenc e  Klein found the unemployment rat e declined 0 . 5  per c ent 
in 1 9 64 as a result o f  the tax cut in the f i r s t  s ix months of the tax cut . 
1 2  
However ,  the reader should no te tha t  the unemployment rat e  represents 
10  
The Revenue Ac t s  o f  the 1 9 20 ' s  are  commonly referred to  as the 
Mellon tax cut s , named a f t er S ecretary of the Treasury , Andrew Mellon. The 
1 9 2 1 Ac t cons olidated brackets and cut the e f f e c t ive marginal rat es by 1 
percent . The 1 9 2 4  Ac t lowered the b o t t om marginal rat e l� percenf and the 
highe s t  rate by 10 p ercent . The 1 9 2 6  Ac t increased exemp t ions and cut the 
rates 1 percent acro s s  the board. The Revenue Ac t of 1 9 6 4  is commonly 
referred to a s  the Kennedy cut. This two-year tax cut r educed t axes on 
taxab le income as follows : 0-2 , 000 were cut 30 p ercent , 2 , 000- 1 0 0 , 000 
ra t e s  were cut 1 6  to  2 0  percent , and over 100 , 000 ra t es were cut  2 3  to 
2 6  p erc ent. S ee Chri s t opher Frenz e , The Mellon and Kennedy Tax Cut s : A 
Review and Analysis , S ubcommi t t e e  on Monetary and Fis cal Pol icy o f  the 
Jo int Economic Commi t t ee , 9 7 th Cong . , 2nd sess . (Washing ton , D. C . : U.S . 
Governmen t P rint ing O f f ic e ,  1 9 8 2 ) . 
1 1
rb id . ,  pp. 8 ,  1 0 - 1 2 , and 23-26 . 
1 2
Lawrenc e  Klein , " Econometric Analysis o f  the T a x  Cut o f  19 6 4 , " in 
Jame s Duesenb erry , ed . , The Brookings Mo del : S ome Fur ther Res ul ts  ( Chicago,
IL : Rand McNa lly & Co . ,  1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 4 59-4 72 . Us ing the Wharton Mo del , Klein 
found the unemployment rat e to drop 0.8 pe rcent in 1 9 6 4  due to the tax cut . 
1 4  
peop le who are ac t ively s e eking work ( ergo , wi lling to  wo rk) but c anno t 
find emp loymen t ;  i t  does no t meas ure their work ef fort . Als o , the use 
of o utput p e r  man hour should no t b e  considered as an ac cura t e  guage of  
work e f fort ,  s ince increases in this index can b e  attrib ut ed t o  o ther 
nongovernment variab le s , s uch as  changes in t echno logy , worker mo rale ,  
level o f  lab o r  f o rce education , reorganizat ion o f  input s , o ther non-
monetary incent ives s uch as worker pride , and managerial abi l i t ies within 
an indus t ry .  
In a s eries o f  s tra t i fied income s tudies , Michae l  Evans , p r esident 
o f  Evans Economics ,  Inc . ,  found a s i gnificant rela tionship between the 
level of taxat ion and work e f fort . In his regress ion analysi s , Evans 
held repo r t ed adj us t ed g ro s s  income levels (AG!) cons tant t o  measure the 
effect  of changes in the AG! a f ter the 1 9 6 4  Revenue Ac t .  As Evans repo rts: 
We found the f o l l owing resul t s  f o r  a 1% reduct ion 
in t ax rat es . For lower income workers , such a 
reduc t ion would rai s e  work e f fo r t  by about 0 . 1% .  
For middle and upper-income workers , the r educ t ion 
was about 0 . 2 5% . For upper-income workers--thos e 
with taxab le  incomes o f  $ 1 2 0 , 000 o r  mor e--we found 
that the elas t i c i t ies were in exces s of 2 . 0 . 1 3  
Evan ' s research als o found that f o r  every one p ercent reduc tion in the 
rat e  of pers onal income tax , the rat e  o f  labor force part i c ipat ion increas ed 
by 0.2 percent and wage rate inc reas es were reduc ed by 0 . 4  per c ent . 
1 4  
While 
Clark does no t p rovide an exp lana t ion as to why worker dis incentives become 
1 3Forecas t ing the S upply S ide o f  the Economy , Hearings before the 
JEC , 9 6 th Congres s , May 2 1 ,  1 9 80 (Washington , D .  C . : USGPO) , 1980, p. 4 7. 
I t  should b e  no t ed that Evans believes that the 2 . 0  elas ticity is over­
s ta t ed b ecause individuals  in this inc ome range are more  likely to  shi ft 
their form o f  income from cap ital gains to earned and back , depending upon 
which rate o f  t axat ion is  lower. Even s o , Evans was able to veri fy his 
s t a t i s t ic s  with cross-sect ional analys is . 
1 4Ibid. , p. 48. 
15 
significant as tax revenues approach 25 percent of National Income, 
Evans' research contains interesting implications for Clark's analysis. 
The degree in which work-leisure substitution takes place in any 
given economy is most likely dependent upon how much income and wealth 
is in the possession of those with the highest substitution elasticities. 
Therefore, the more wealth that is concentrated at the higher end of the 
income spectrum, the more the work-leisure substitution effect will pre-
dominate in a given society, consequently, the lower the taxable limit. 
In other words, the more wealth is concentrated, the more_!_f!: f_!_<!!;.!..q_Ili!.!:Y 
~--------
In fact, Clark does make some allowances for the distribution of 
income. In countries with a relatively equal income distribution, infla-
tion will occur when tax revenues exceed 18 percent of National Income, 
rather than at 25 percent. Clark bases this conclusion on the apparent 
statistical relationship. As Clark explains, "This means on the whole, 
to be borne out by the figures." 15 If Evans' research is correct, then 
higher taxable limits, not lower ones, would be expected when incomes are 
11 d . .b d 16 equa y 1str1 ute • It should also be noted that for a society to 
achieve income equality, there would have to be a political consensus that 
income equality is desirable. Thus, a higher social and economic tolerance 
15
colin Clark, "Public Finance and the Changes in the Value of 
Money," The Economic Journal (New York, NY: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1945), 
p. 383. 
16This is because per capita income would be lower and thus, the 
work-leisure substitution effect less predominate. If this effect does 
not predominate among the members of the society, then the inflationary 
effects would not occur until tax revenues as a percent of income became 
very high. 
1 6  
of high tax rates  would be  expect ed ; any negat ive e f fect s would have t o  
be cons idered , on balanc e , with t h e  des irab i l ity o f  income equality . 
Therefore , even i f  inf lat ion is  incurred in the achievement o f  this 
soc ial  goa l , it may be considered the lesser of two evi ls by that society . 
When incomes are more equal ly d is t r ibut ed ,  then more o f  the populat ion is  
in the  area with lower leisure  s ubst i t ut ion elast icit ies . Therefore , a 
high leve l o f  taxat ion i s  neces sary f o r  the sub s t i tut ion effect  t o  b ecome 
signif icant . 
Clark b e lieved the s e  factors became s ignif icant enough t o  induce 
inf lat ion when tax r evenues exceeded 25 perc ent of Nat ional Income becaus e 
there was a stat i st ical correlat ion . Therefor e , t o  as sess  the validity o f  
Cla rk ' s  analys is , an examinat ion o f  his data is in order . 
Dat a  
P r i o r  to  World  W a r  I I , there was n o  cons i s t ency i n  t h e  formulat ion 
of Nat ional Income stat i s t ics . While the Unit ed S ta t es and the Uni t ed 
Kingdom have been the p ioneers in formulat ing cons i s t ent and reliable dat a ,  1 7  
none o f  this data was f o rmulat ed in any consis t ent metho dolo gy before the 
1900 ' s .  It wasn ' t un t i l  1 9 4 4  that the use of cert ain concep ts of national 
income account b ecame int ernat ionally defined . 1 8  The establishment of the 
Organi zat i on for European E conomi c Cooperat ion in 1 960 increased the numb er 
of countries that used int e rnat ional ly recognized concept s , me thods and 
17
osker Morgenst ein , On the Accuracy of Economic Observat ions 
(Princeton , NJ : Princeton Univers ity P res s ,  19 50) , p .  2 4 2 . 
1 8
This oc ci.wred when Canadian , Brit ish and American o f fic ials met 
t o  agree upon what should b e  included in di f f erent income s t atis t ics . S ee 
Paul S t udenski , The Income o f  Nat ions (New York , NY: New York Univers ity 
Pres s , 196 1 ) , Vo l .  1 ,  p .  1 5 4 . 
forms o f  nat ional income account s .  Prior t o  this t ime ( 1 9 46- 1 9 5 5) 
eighty countries had nat iona l income s t a t i s t ics ; however , only four 
countries had o f f ic ia l  acco unt s .  19 
Even where these  s t a t i s t i c s  were o f f i c ia l , their ac curacy is 
ques t ionab l e  before 1 9 50 . For exampl e ,  OECD f ound French National Income 
in 1 9 49 t o  b e  80 percen t  accura t e.
2 0  
In the United  S t at es (where an o f f i.,... 
c ial  s t a t i s t ical metho dolo gy was not es t ab lished unt i l  1947)  S imon Kuznets 
found nat ional s tat i s t ics  t o  have a mar gin o f  error o f  about 1 0  percent .
2 1  
In the United Kingdom, the C ent ra l S tat i s t i cal Office  did  no t have a 
me thod o f  determining the margin o f  error unt il 1956 .
2 2  
This error was 
found t o  range from 3 percent for  s ome s t a t i s t ic s  to 1 5  percent for 
o thers .
2 3  
Therefo re , one mus t  b ewar e  of any analysis  based on nat ional 
income prior to  the 1 9 60 ' s. 
In C lark ' s ana lysis , many of the movements in nat iona l  income may 
b e  from errors in measurement , change s  in s tatis t ical  metho do logy , or  from 
real economic fac tors , or  a l l  o f  t hes e fac t o rs . 2 4  S inc e C lark gathered his 
own data , there i s  no way t o  det ermine the s tatist ical accuracy of the 
19 Ib id . , p .  1 5 5. 
20
Ib id . , Vo l .  2 ,  p .  102 . 
2 1osker Mo rgenst ein , op . c i t . , p .  2 7 3 .  For examp le , if GNP was 550 
b i l lion do llars , this would be accura t e  within 6 0  b i l l ion dollars . 
2 2
Ibid . , p .  26 8 . 
2 3Fo r more informat ion s e e  Nat iona l Income S t at i s t ics : Sources 
and Metho ds (London , UK : H.  M.  S t at ionary Of fice , 1 9 5 6 ) . 
2 4It should b e  no t ed that thes e s ta t i s t ical prob lems we re not unique 
to C lark . In the nex t part o f  this chapt e r , some degree o f  s t at i s t ical 
accuracy in C lark's data wi ll  be  granted . Even if his data was  ac curate , 
there are many p rob lems wi th C lark ' s s t a t i s t ical conc lus ions . 
data pr es ent ed  in his analys i s . Thus , it  is  d i f f icult t o  a s s e s s  the 
accuracy of Clark ' s conc lus ion . 
On the surface , C lark's French s t a t i s t ics  look convincing , as  
shown in Appendix I ,  Tab le 1 .  In this t ab l e  Clark shows his longes t 
data s eries . As Clark d es c r ibes : 
France found hers elf , when the wor ld level o f  prices 
became s tabi li z ed in 192 2 , with t axat ion ab sorbing 
2 5% of  her nat iona l income , and with an uncovered 
deficit  represent ing a further 8% o f nat iona l income . 
This burden was int o lerab le , and a deva luat ion o f  the 
franc was c lear ly indicat ed . By 19 2 4  equi librium was 
in sight . In 1 9 2 5  and 1 9 2 6  it  appeared that the mark 
had b een oversho t • • • The devaluat ion was ther efore 
sharply checked in 1 9 2 6 . But it  wil l  be noted that 
the value of money fina l ly adop ted was s uch as to make 
the rat io o f  taxation t o  nat iona l income a lmo s t  exact ly 
2 5% for  the next four years • 
• The French deflat ion o f  1 9 3 1 - 3 5  commenced with 
taxat ion a lready at  2 6% o f  the national income , and 
was foredoomed to fai lur e f rom the s tart . T axat ion 
could not  in fact be raised to any sub s t antia l ly 
higher p roport ion , and a mounting d efici t  accumu­
lated . 
By 1 9 34 Franc e  found herse l f  a gain in a s imilar p o s i tion 
to that of 19 2 2 • • • The s i t uat ion of the years 1936- 38 
cannot be  analyz ed a s  precisely a s  the previous d eva lua­
tion , b ecaus e of rap idly ris ing military exp enditur e , 
but the tendency t o  s e t t l e  down with taxat ion in the 
neighb o rhoo25of  2 5% of the nat ional income can again be no t ic ed . 
1 8  
I n  the t ime periods lis ted , C lark indi cat ed t hat price  increases  are due 
to heavy taxat ion p lus government deficit s .  However , a c los e examination 
of a f ew o f  the years contradict  Clark ' s exp lana t ion . For ins tanc e ,  the 
larges t price increase is f rom 40.0. in 192 5 to 505 in 1 926 . Yet taxes plus 
def i c i t s  in this time p eriod only chan ged 0.3 percen t o f  national income 
and were wel l  below the 2 5  p ercent limi t ( 21 per c ent and 2 1 . 2  percent , 
2 5colin C lark , "Pub lic Finance and Changes in the Value of Money , "  
££.• c i t . , pp . 376- 3 7 7 .  
respec t ive ly) . I f  C lark ' s sugge s t ed two-year lag is us ed, this example  
is f easib l e , but  no t f o r  o ther examp les . In 19 3 3 ,  the p rice index is  
given as 5 2 0 , t axa t ion as  2 6 . 5  percent and the def i c i t  as  5 . 8  percent . 
1 9  
Yet two years lat e r  in 1 9 35 , the large s t  pri c e  drop i n  the series occurs 
with an index of 482 . C lark ' s  lat er inf erence o f  a three-year lag does 
not work ei ther . Us ing the s ame examp l e , t axes p lu s  deficit in 1 9 34 are 
s t i l l  over Clark's l imi t , a ltho ugh by not as  much as  in 1 9 35 .  With o r  
wi thout lags , from 1 9 2 3  t o  1 9 2 7 ,  there were price  increases when t axes 
p lus d e f i c i t s  were be low the cri tical  l imi t . 
Pechman and Mayor averaged C lark ' s  s t a t i s t ics  o f  France t o  f ind 
out if any re lat ionship exis ted  (Appendix I ,  Table 2) . Taxes alone 
exceeded Clark's limi t in only one p eriod , 1 9 28 t o  1 9 35 , averaging 2 6 . 3  
percent o f  nat ional income ; only when d e f ic i t s  are included does Clark ' s  
l imit work . This would lead one to conclude def i ci t s , no t t axes , are the 
cause of inf lat ion . C la rk also c ons idered Great B r i tain , Belgium ,  I t a ly ,  
Japan , and Norway , primar i ly from 19 2 5  t o  1 9 30 (Appendix I I , Tab le 1 ) . 
The inclus ion o f  I t a ly is  surprising s inc e ( a )  B enit o  Muss olini b e gan his 
fas c i s t  dictat o r ship in 19 2 2 , and (b) i t  does not support C lark ' s  thes is .  
When taxat ion a s  a percent o f  income increas e s  from 1 5 . 3 percent in 19 2 6  
to 2 2 . 0  percent i n  1 9 2 9 , the price index falls  from 5 1 7  t o  446 . One wou ld 
expect  the oppos i t e  s ince taxat ion is  nearing the cri t ical limit . Japan , 
another mil i tary dictatorship , is o f  lit t le value t o  Clark ' s  proo f , s inc e 
prices vary b etween 2 18 and 1 8 2  wi thout any s i gnifi cant change in t axa t ion ;  
the same i s  t rue for Norway . Britain has only s l i gh t  pric e f luctuat ions 
and very l it t l e  change in t axat ion , leaving one to wonder why it was inc luded 
in the analysis . 
2 0  
P erhaps t h e  Belgium examp l e  i s  t h e  mo s t  int eres t ing becaus e i t  
is one o f  C la rk � s excep tions t o  the 2 5  p ercent l imi t . C lark indicates  
that the "Low c o unt ries , "  S candinavia and a f ew o f  the British Dominions 
have a lower l imi t due to t heir s iz e  and p ersona l  wealth distribut ion . 
Belgium ' s l imit o f  1 8  percent i s  r eached in 1 9 2 8  and the pric e index moves 
from 798 to 869 in 1 9 30 , one o f  the f ew cons i s t en t  observat ions C lark 
2 6 has . 
Data in C lark ' s later wri t ings
2 7 
inc l udes a f ew addit ions , but i t  
is diff icult t o  analyz e  t h e  data s ince h e  creat es his own price indices 
to include the a f fect  o f  the foreign s ector .
2 8  
Recall f rom the previous 
sect ion tha t when exchange rat es are f ixed , f luctuations in overs ea s  
exchange rates a r e  forced on dome s t i c  prices , and this is what C lark 
a t t empt s  to control with this index . However ,  Clark ' s omiss ion of agri-
cultural produc t s  s eriously biases his indices in the foreign sector  
adjus tment and the dome s t ic base o f  the  index .
29 
2 6
rt is no t c l ear why Norway is not inc luded With the S candinavian 
count ries . He s ingles out Norway as  having the highest social expend iture 
as a percen t  of nat ional income . Perhaps an examinat ion o f  Norway in this 
manner would have been more  useful t o  Clark . 
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clark's t es t imony in Emplo)'}!!ent , Growth and Price Levels, Join t 
Economic ·Commit t ee, 86 th Congres s , ·Reso lut ion'.' 1 3, Octob er 1,  1 9 59 ( Wash­
ington, D .  C . : USGPO), espec ially pp . 2459-2 4 7 7, wi l l  b e  us ed as repre­
sentative o f  Clark ' s later writ ings , s ince it  i s  the mo st  comprehens ive . 
2 8c1ark uses " Excess  wage increas es over produc t ivity increases at 
normal level s  of product ion impor t s  and exp o r t s  per year." Clark does not 
indi cat e how he weight s wo rld t rade dependence  int o  this fac t o r  as  well as 
wo rld trade a c t ivity into this secto r ,  so  we c anno t check his calculat ion . 
For the United S tates , i t  do es not represent a c oncernab l e  differenc e 
during the t ime period s tudied . 
2 9
For examp le , i f  agricultur e  produc t s  were inc luded in the average 
price  index for the Uni t ed S t a t e s  s eries from 1 933-58  (Appendix I I I , Figure 
1 ) , the average would have gone from 3 . 0  to 2 . 5 .  If we cont inue to lower 
the indices ( o r  raise them as the case may be)  the relat ionship is less 
s t riking . Emp loyment , Growth , and Pri ce Leve l s , .£.£.• c i t . , p .  2 4 6 4. 
This is why Clark ' s  lat er resul t s  have never b een confirmed . 
Francis Bator made s everal a t t emp ts  to  conf irm C lark ' s  limit by using 
s everal dif ferent lags and price indices . As Bator not es : 
The l i t t le evidence we have app ears t o  b e  agains t 
Clark . Whether one us es the consumer price index 
or that for who lesale prices , whether concurrent 
dat a  o r  a two-or three-year lag (as  specified by 
Clark) , whether 2S percent or 2 7  percent (or  even 
3 0  percent ) , the only t wo periods s ince the war 
dur ing which prices did no t ris e ( 1 9 48-49 and , 
d ep ending on th e  ind ex , 19Sl-S3 or 1 9S4-SS) should 
have b een , by C lark ' s conjec tur e ,  years of marked 
in f lat ion . Evid ent ly a rat io o f  tax r evenue t o  
nat iona l  income i n  excess  o f  2S p ercent ( o r  2 7  
30 percent , or 30 percent)  does not imp ly inf lat ion. 
21 
Due to the impact of C la rk ' s theory , it is  important to  conf irm o r  rej ect 
the 2S percent t axab l e  limit . At this point , i t  is necessary t o  develop 
the model t o  t es t  C lark ' s hypo thes is . From thi s  ffio del, the s i gnificance 
of the relationship between tax revenues and inf lat ion can be assessed . 
30sat o r  notes  here that " I f  he means 2 5  percent ( and is willing to  
accept  either the consumer o r  the  wholesale ind ex) , part  o f  the evidence 
is s t i l l  relevant--and inconsi s t ent with the hypothes i s . (The imp licit 
defla tor for GNP fell only b etween 1948  and 19 49 ) . Francis Bator , .£e..· ci t . , 
p. SS. 
CHAPTER I I I  
METHODOLOGY * 
This chap ter dis cus ses the me tho d  
o f  tes t ing Clark's hypo thes is . 
Regression analys is , an econometric
 p ro cedure o f  s t at i s t i cal calculat i
on , 
is the method  us ed to develop a tes
t model. Regres s ion analys is can 
determine how o f  ten a change in on
e variab le wi ll coincide with a chang
e 
in ano ther variable. S ince the me
thods o f  meas uring data can af fect 
the 
res ults o f  regres s ion analys is , a 
b rief  introduct ion t o  regres s ion 
ana-
lys is is  p res ent ed in the firs t s e
c t ion o f  this chapter . The s e cond
 
section dis cus s es how the variab le
s are de fined and p rob lems ass ocia
t ed 
with the meas urement of the s e  var
iab les . This  s e c t ion is fol lowed
 by a 
dis cus s i on o f  the p reliminary tes t 
o f  the model . 
Regres s ion Analysis  
A s imp le regres s ion equat ion defin
es a linear relat ionship s uch 
as : 
Y = a +  BX + u 
(1) 
where: Y = a variab le dep endent o
n X 
a = the ver tical intercep t  ( cons t
ant )  
B = the coe f f icient o f  X 
X = a variab le that i s  s us pected , 
a priori 
t o  exert in fluence on Y 
u = the error term 
The ob serve d values of  X and Y can b e  sampled in one o f  two dif ferent 
methods to fit this relationship. In cross sectional dat a ,  the samples 
* 
This chap t er assumes the reade r h
as had a basic cours e in Al geb ra 
and S tat i s t ic s .  I f  the reader do
es no t have this b a ckground , mos t
 o f  Chap ter 
III can be  skipped without a loss
 in comp rehension . 
2 2  
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are observed at a given point in time. In time series data, the samples 
are observed over many time periods. { Although Clark used both kinds of 
data, this analysis uses time series data to test the relationship./ With 
time series data the relationship between the variables can be tested over 
the past se�enteen years. / 
Ordinary least squares are generally employed in regression ana-
lysis since it estimates coefficients that are the best unbiased, efficient,
and consistent with the sample's population. 1 The estimated coefficient 
will possess these properties if the following assumptions are not vio-
lated: 
1. The equation describes a linear relationship between X and Y. 
2. The X's are non-random and fixed (non-stochastic). 
3. The error term (u) has an expected value of zero. This will 
occur if the error term is normally distributed around zero. 
A violation of this assumption is referred to as heterosche­
dasticity. 
4 .  The error term in time t is unrelated to the error term in 
the previous time period, t-1. A violation of this assumption 
is referred to as first order autocorrelation. 
5 .  The error term is unrelated to the variables; they are 
independent. A violation of thi� assumption is referred to 
as second order autocorrelation. 
Once a coefficient is determined, several statistics are used to 
determine if the assumptions are violated and if the relationship is 
significant. It is important to determine if the assumptions hold before 
1A more complete explanation of regression analysis can be found 
in: Henry Theil, Principles of Econometrics (New York, NY: John Wiley, 
1971). 
2navid Katz, Econometric Theory and Applications (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: DS Prentice Hall, Inc., 1982), p. 6 7 .  
2 4  
a significance test is performed since the significance test may lead to 
false conclusions. Consequently, a biased coefficient would be used to 
represent the relationship tested. The statistics used to test the 
assumptions are the Durbin-Watson, the coefficient of determination (R
2
) ,  
and the correlation matrix. 3 The significance test uses the T statistic, 
the F statistic, and R2• The simpler significance statistics will be 
explained first, followed by the more complicated statistics. 
The T Statistic 
Before the T statistic can be defined, the term "standard error" 
must be explained. Standard error is defined as the standard deviation of 
a sampling distribution from the sample's mean value. However, this tech-
nical definition is vague to the layman. The mean refers to the average of 
all observed values of a given variable, mathematically expressed as: 
where: 
x 
N 
L: 
N = 1 
N 
xi 
N the number of observations 
i = the 
( 2 )  
The standard deviation (S) describes how far observations vary from the 
sample's mean value. Mathematically, it is expressed as: 
N 
E 
s = ( 
N =;: l
(Xi - X)2 1 
)"2 
(3) 
N- 1 
3An explanation of the correlation matrix is omitted here. The 
interested reader may consult any introductory econometrics book to gain 
an insight of this analytical tool. 
 
The standard error ( SE} can then be expressed 
s 
S E  = 
N� 
4 as: 
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(4) 
The standard error is then used to calculate the T statistic. The 
T statistic measures how much influence a given X has on a given Y .  Usually, 
a critical value is established and if the T value exceeds (or is less than 
the negative value) the critical value, the variable can be considered a 
significant influence on Y .  The coefficient of X shows the magnitude of 
this influence. The mathematical expression of the T statistic is: 5 
where: 
T (X - W) 
(SE )  
W = the assumed population mean 
The Coefficient of Determination <R2) 
(5) 
The R2 statistic measures how much of the variation in the dependent 
variable (Y ) is explained by the model. The value of R2 is always between 
0 and l; the closer to 1 ,  the more the model explains the variation of Y .  
Mathematically, R2 is: 
R2 = 
1: (xy)2 
(6) 
1:x 2 1:y 2 
where: x = ( X. - X) and 
1 
y = (Y . - Y) l. 
When the regression model has many variables, the R2 value may increase 
without an increase in the amount of variation in Y explained by the model. 6 
4Katz, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
5 
Ibid. , p. 32. 
6For example, an equation may have several insignificant variables, 
but have an R2 value close to 1 .  Ibid., p. 116. 
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increase in the number of xy terms sunnnated . Thus, most 
computer programs report an adj usted R2 value, calculated as: 
where: 
- 2 2 R = 1- ( 1 - R ) 
(N - 1 )  
N - K 
K = the number of regressors 
(7) 
When the adj usted R2 is close to 1 and the variables have failed the T-test, 
then the assumptions of the analysis have been violated . This may be due 
to non-linearity of the relationship, a relationship between the independent 
variables, or heteroscedasticity. In order to determine which of these is 
the problem, a closer examination of the other statistics is necessary. 
Analysis of Variance ( F-st � tistic) 
The F test determines the significance of the model . The F test 
is one method of verifying the results of the T test. Mathematically, F 
can be expressed 7 as: 
F = 
(J.<- 1, N-K) 
R2 (N - K} ( 8 )  
( 1 -R2 ) (K - 1) 
Like the T test, the F test relies on a predetermined critical value to 
surmise if the model is significant. The F test is a good test to check 
the significance of the model since it accounts for the number of regressors 
as well as the number of observations. 
J)urbin-Watson 
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic measures the level of first order 
autocorrelation. When an autocorrelation is present, the assumptions of 
regression analysis have been violated and model adj ustments roust be made . 
7Ibid . ,  p .  1 1 7 
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ideal value of DW is 2 ; values that lie in between the upper and lower 
lead to indeterminate conclusions about the existence of 
A DW that is less than the lowest critical value or 
highest critical value reveals definite negative or 
positive first order autocorrelation . The DW statistic is calculated as: 
N 
E (ut-ut-1)2 
(9) t = 2 DW = N 2 
E 
u
t 
t = 1 
utocorrelation is often associated with measurement error within the data . 
his problem is especially acute when time series data is employed because 
he error term is allowed to accumulate and bias coefficient estimates . 
erefore, it is imperative that the variables be defined and the observa-
ions measured as accurately as possible . 
efining the Problem 
The problem is to determine at which point the level of taxation 
ecomes a detriment to the productive capacity of an economy . This concept, 
eferred to as taxable capacity , is generally considered within a po litical 
ontext, not an economic one . Even among economists , political upheavals 
8The critical region varies with the number of regressors and 
bservations . See James Durbin and G .  S .  Watson , " Testing for Serial 
orrelation in Least Sqaures Regression, " Biometrica (New Haven, CT: 
ale University Press) , January 1951 ,  pp . 159- 1 7 8 .  The critical regions 
re delineated in Chapter 4 of this paper . 
28 
are generally used to determine when an economy's taxable limit has been 
reached.9 This ad hoc approach has provided modern theory with little 
insight into the nature of this problem . 
A logical sequence indicates the economic limit is reached before 
the political expression of the limit occurs. As William Crotty observes: 
• • • what constitutes an opinion of political 
relevance are determined by the situational 
factors present at the point in time that is 
in question.10 
Thus, the taxable limit must be evident to the populace before the poli-
tical opposition to this limit occurs. In other words, there should be a 
"leading indicator" of sorts that signals the economy is nearing its tax-
able limit . 
Clark considered the declining value of money to be the economic 
signal that a system had reached its taxable limit. He measured the changes 
in the value of money as changes in "retail prices" and referred to these 
changes as inflation. It is unclear which price index Clark used. It is 
also unclear at which level increases in the price index must be classified 
as inflationary . Therefore, to understand and measure taxable limit, it is 
necessary to determine what constitutes inflation. 
9
For example, Jude Wanniski uses revolution of the masses as an 
indicator of a taxable limit. See Jude Wanniski, The Way the World Works 
(New York, NY :  Basic Books, Inc . ,  1972), Chs . 2 and 3 .  
10william Crotty, Public Opinion and Politics (New York, NY :  Rine­
hart & Winston, I nc., 1970), p. 2. It shou ld be noted that this applies 
to any economic problem, whether it is tax policy, growth, unemp loyment, 
etc. 
Defining Inflation 
Webster's Dictionary defines "inflation" as : 
An increase in the volume of money and credit 
relative to available goods resulting in a 
substantial and continuing rise in the general 
price leve1. l l 
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Economists do not generally agree upon this definition of inflation. First, 
the phrase "substantial and continuing" is vague ; how substantial and how 
continuing must price increases be to consider them as inflationary? Second, 
the definition indicates that price increases are a symptom of inflation and 
not considered inflation in and of itself. Third, inflation is defined as a 
causal relationship, and even the strictest of monetarists would concede 
that not all inflation stems from an increase in the volume of money and 
credit. As G. L. Bach observes : 
Under it, inflation may or may not be associated 
with rising price levels, and rising prices may 
or may not be associated with inflation. • • • it 
is not operationally clear (what is an overissue of 
money? ) l 2 
As an alternative, Bach defines inflation as a rise in the general 
price level. 
13 Bernard Herber defines inflation as " • • •  an increase in 
the level of index of various prices. " 
14 Howard Sherman defines inflation 
11
webster ' s  New Collegiate Dictionary, lS Oth Anniversary ed. (Spring­
field, MA: G & C Merriam-Webster, 19 81), p. 5 86. 
12G. L . Bach, The New Inflation, 2 ed . (Providence, RI : Brown Uni­
versity Press, 1972), p .  6. Words in parentheses are my own. 
13Ibid., p. S. 
14Bernard Herber, Modern Public Finance, 4th ed. (New York, NY :  
Richard I rwin, I nc. , 1979), p. 39 2. 
as ". • 
15 
• a rise in the average price level of all goods." 
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Other econ-
omists, such as William Thorp and Richard Quandt, 16 \Villiam Albrecht, Jr., 17 
18 
and Milton Spencer also define inflation in this manner. Since this is 
a more generally accepted definition of inflation, it will be the one used 
in this analysis. Mathematically, inflation can be expressed as: 
v1here: 
PI - PI 1 t t-
PI 1 t-
(100). 
the price index 
INF 
t 
PI 
t 
t-1 
INF 
the current time period in years 
the previous time period 
inflation expressed as a percentage 
rate of inflation 
(10) 
Yet this definition still does not give a real meaning to the term 
inflation. Under this definition, any increase in the general price level, 
no matter how small, would be considered inflation. However, increases in 
the general price level may be due to increases in the quality of many pro-
ducts, a one-time shift in consumer preference toward consumption rather 
than savings, or any other factors that could cause a one-time price 
increase. Also, the fact that the price level rises does not necessarily 
indicate a problem exists. Steady price increases are necessary to maintain 
production incentives for producers. As Koilpillai J. Charles observes: 
15 Howard Sherman, Stagflation, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1983), p. 15. 
16
william Thorp and Richard Quandt, The New Inflation (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1959), pp. 1-2. 
17
william Albrecht, Jr., Economics, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), p. 161. 
18 . Milton Spencer, Contemporary Economics, 5th ed. (New York, NY: 
Worth Publishers, 1983), p. D-20. In fact, this definition (rather than 
the \lebster definition) is used in most principles of economics textbooks. 
.) 
Some writers apply the term to all price 
increases. • • Rising prices are one of 
the facts of contemporary international 
economic life. • • •  Some increases in 
prices seem to characterize all economies 
of the modern world , and who can say that 
a l l  economies are unhealthy. We have to 
accept that a certain measure of price 
increase is normal to healthy economies 
in the contemporary world. 19 
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Char les suggests that the rate of change
 in inf lation , not the inf lation 
rate , shoul d  be used for research. If
 the rate of increase is smal l ,  prices 
are considered stable ; if the rate of in
crease is large , then it shoul d  be 
considered as significant. What should be
 considered " large" or "small" 
should be based on the past performance o
f the economy in question. This 
\ 
�ind of analytical treatment of inf lation
 can be traced to Joan Robinson's 
\ 20 
ear lier contributions to inflation theo
ry. 
In this study, the rate of change in the
 inflation rate wil l be 
referred to as the rate of inflation acce
leration (RIA): 
Price Index 
INF - INF l 
t t-
INF l 
t-
( 1 00) = RIA t 
(1 1 )  
The choice of a price index is the next
 step necessary to the ana-
lysis. Bach presents the fol lowing cri
teria for choosing an appropriate 
p�jce index on which to calculate rates
 of inflation.2
1 
19Koilpil lai, J. Charles , The Myth of Inf
lation , 2nd ed. (Manitoba ,  
Canada: Highnel l Printing Ltd., 1 968) , p
. 10. 
20 Joan Robinson, Col lected Economic Paper
s ( Oxford, UK :  Basil 
Blackwel l, Ltd. , 1 9 60) , p.  89. 
2 1sach , 2£.• .£!!_. ,  p. 5 .  Labor costs should be excluded since
 
increases in labor costs contain cost of
 living adj ustment for inf lation 
in the previous time period. Thus, excl
uding labor costs avoids double 
counting of inf lation. 
1 .  It must be a broadly based inde
x. 
2 .  It must be representative of c
onunodity 
and service prices. 
3. It should exclude labor costs. 
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Bach suggests the use of the const.l
lller price index (CPI) , as computed b
y the 
'U . S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BL
S) , and the Gross National Product 
Implicit Price Deflator (GNPD) , as c
alculated by the U.S. Department of
 
Commerce. As William Gale notes, th
e maj or difference in the two indic
es 
is that the GNPD measures the ef fec
t of government expenditures while 
the 
CPI measur�s only the changes in the
 level of retail prices.
2 2  Since the 
relationship to be tested is betwe
en inflation and a ratio involving 
national 
income, use of the GNPD provides a 
built-in relationship and is an ina
ppro-
priate choice. 
The CPI also presents problems for 
this analysis. This index is 
biased due to the manner in which i
t is calculated. First, it relies 
more 
heavily on price changes in urban a
reas than rural areas, causing this
 index 
to be slightly overstated . Second
ly, the index focuses on goods commo
nly 
bought by lower income families so 
that many goods are omitted from th
e 
. 23 index. Third, the degree of infl
uence a good has on the index, or i
ts 
weight , is determined by periodic c
onsumer syrveys by the BLS, and thu
�, 
the weight remains fixed until the 
next survey period. This fixed wei
ght 
does not a llow for rapid changes i
n consumer preferences, resulting 
in over-
or under estimated index values. 
22wil liam Gale, Inf lation : Causes, 
Consequents , and Control 
(Cambridge , MA :  Oelschlager, Gunn, 
and Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1 9 8 1 ) , 
P •  4. 
23 �- · p .  5 .  
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Notwithstanding, the CPI does have advantages. First, more is known 
about the error in the CPI than the GNPD, making error adj ustments easier. 
Second, there is more international methodological standardization with the 
CPI than with many other deflators , since similar survey techniques are 
employed to determine which goods will be used to measure the price changes. 
Third, other deflat ors measure price changes based on a particular accounting 
statistic (e . g., GNP, Net National Product, National Income, etc.). Since 
these statistics include labor income, Bach's third criteria is violated and 
double counting of inflation may result. 
However, William Gale has found that there is not a significant dif-
ference in which measure is used to calculate the rate of inflation . In his 
correlation analysis, Gale found a very high correlation between the three 
most widely used price indices : CPI, GNPD, and the P roducer P rices Final 
Goods Index (PPFG) . 24 In a correlation matrix, the numbers in the matrix 
reveal how often changes in the statistic listed in the columns coincide 
with changes in the statistic listed in the rows . A value of 1. 0 0  indicates 
perfect correlation ; a value close to zero indicates the two statistics are 
unrelated. The table below shows the correlation Gale found between these 
three indices from 1948- 1 979: 
24The PPFG is issued by the BLS. This index measures changes in 
the price of final goods before these goods are sold at the retail level. 
It is determined by a survey of wholesalers of final goods . 
CP I 
GNPD 
PPFG 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN I NFLATION RATES 
1948- 1 9 79 * 
CPI 
1 . 00 
GNPD 
.96 
1 . 00 
PPFG 
. 9 4 
• 9 5  
1 . 0 0 
*Source: William Gale, Inflation: Causes, Consequents 2 and 
Control ( Cambridge, MA :  Oelschlager, Gunn, and 
Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 4 .  
34 
The matrix numbers are all close to 1 . 00 and reveals that the indices are 
highly correlated. Due to this relationship, Gale concludes that ". 
the choice between these measures of inflation is more a matter of 
aesthetics in conforming to a theory than of practical difference.1 1 25 
The consumer price index is the closest to Clark's retail prices. 
/ionsumer Price Index 
The U.S . Bureau of Labor Statistics calculates the CPI measuring 
the change in price of a "basket" of commonly purchased consumer goods. 
Each good is assigned a weight26 on the basis of the fraction of household 
budget spent on the good ; this fraction is determined by the BLS Survey of 
Consumer Expenditures. Gale cites seven different types of error problems 
in the calculation of the consumer price index. They are: 
25 
1 .  Omission of many goods 
2 .  Omission of consumers 
3 .  Periodic omission of goods 
4 .  Not allowing for substitutes when there is a 
change in the relative prices of goods 
Gale, op. cit . ,  p. 5. 
26There is a tremendous amount of controversy over the use of fixed 
weight, and this discussion will be omitted from this paper . The interested 
reader should see Paul Earl, ed., Analysis of Inflation (Lexington, MA :  
Lexington Books, Inc . ,  1 9 7 7 ) , as we'll as various other BLS publications . 
5 .  No t a l lowing for changes in the cho ice o f  
consumer goods 
6 .  S amp ling errors in surveys 2 7  
7 . Incomp l e t e  adj us tments for  qua l i ty changes 
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Gale found that thes e  measurement errors can caus e autoco rrela t ed errors 
in regre s s ion analys is , l eading to biased coefficient e s t ima t es . l�en 
monthly CPI s ta t i s t i c s  are used , the coefficient b ias s t ems from a l l  s even 
of the onnni s s ions lis ted above wi th omi t t ed cons umers b eing the mo s t  sig-
ni ficant source  o f  autocorrelation . The t o t a l  b ias in es t imat ed coeffi-
cients was found by Ga le to be  2 . 9  when monthly data are  us ed . Fo r 
quart erly CPI data , the auto c o rrelated error is caus ed by the omi s s ion o f  
consumers and inadequa t e  qua l i ty adj us tments . The e ffect  o f  these omiss ions 
caus es e s t ima ted regres s ion co efficients t o  b e  b ias ed by approxima t ely 1 . 6 7 .  
Th e same omiss ions caus e  aut ocorrelated error when annua l s ta t is t ics  are 
used . However ,  th e prob lem is less severe and b ias the es t imat ed coeffi­
c ient s  by only 1 . 0 7 .
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Henc e , annua l data wi l l  b e  us ed to minimi z e  the 
autocorrela t e d  erro r . 
The Rat io 
C lark bel ieved total  government receip ts ( inc luding b o th local 
and c ent ral government s )  should b e  used to  measure total tax revenues . 
His r eas oning was tha t  o f t en taxes are "disguised" in the form o f  licens ing 
fees , surtaxes , t o l ls , e t c . , and that these  f ees could dis courag e  p roduc t ive 
ac t ivity much l ike direct 29 income taxes ( a l though no t to the same degree) . 
2 7Gale , ££..• ci t . , p .  5 2. 
2 8  . 
I b i d . , pp . 52-53. 
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For examp le an ind ividua l may wo rk very hard and save for better  
housing . If  this  individua l  incurs licensing fees  and p eriodic p roperty 
taxes tha t exceed one-ha l f  of their monthly budge t ,  the p erson may b ecome 
dis co uraged , s urrender their  aspirat ions , and reduce work e f fo r t  substan­
tial ly . 
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Total governmen t receip t s  are also a very s tandardized  calculat ion in 
int ernat ional s ta t is t i cs , therefore , this accoun t ing iden t i ty will  b e  
used to  measure tax revenues i n  this ana lysi s . 
Nat ional I ncome , however , i s  no t so eas i ly comp ared  on  an int er-
nat ional basis . In the Uni t e d  S tates , Nat iona l Inc ome is c a lcula t ed by 
sub trac t ing Depreciat ion and Indirect  Bus iness Taxes and adding S ub s i dies 
to Gro s s  Nat ional Product . In the Uni ted Kingdom , France , Germany , and 
o th er Europ ean countries , Nat i onal Income is calculat ed by sub t ra c t ing 
S ubs idies and Deprecia tion f rom Gro s s  Nat iona l P roduc t .
30 
Therefore , i t  
is unc l ear which method o f  ca lcula t ion C la rk us ed . I n  this analys i s , the 
o f ficially reported Nat ional Income wi l l  be used . However , the r eader 
should be aware o f  the metho do logica l d i f f erenc es in this s ta t is t ic among 
nat ions .
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The ma thematical  exp ress ion of the rat i o  i s : 
TR 
NI 
(10 0 )  x 
where : TR = t o t a l  government receip t s  
N I  = Nat ional Income 
X = the ratio as a p ercentage 
( 1 2} 
Whi le C lark used this s tat i s t ic to  show how the interact ion b e tween 
the tax revenues and nat iona l income cause inf lat ion , i t  r ea l ly i s  no t 
des crip t ive o f  his hypothetical intera c t ion . When tax s chedules are pro-
. 3 2  . fl  . 1 . i 1 . 1 . . 1 gre s s ive , in at ion not on y increases nom na nat i ona income , i t  a s o  
30In the U . S . this s ta t is tic  is c loser to N e t  Nat i onal P roduc t 
than Nat iona l Income . 
3 1 Re c a l l  from Chap ter 2 ,  Franc is Ba t o r ' s  research revealed that 
the me thod of c a l culat ion did no t af fect the s i gni f i cance of his regres-
sion result s .  
32  Recall  from Chap ter 2 ,  Clark ' s  theory was t rue only when tax 
s chedules were progres s ive and p roport iona l . 
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· t ' t 3 3  I f  d . 1 . . increases ax receip s .  tax r evenues an na t iona income increase 
propor t iona t e ly wi th inflat ion , then the ratio would remain con s t an t  (or  
change l i t t le)  when inf la t ion increases . The only way the rat io could  b e  
pos i t ively related t o  inf lat ion is i f  t ax revenues ro se more  rap idly than 
inflat ion . The speed a t  which tax r evenues ris e i s  det ermined by the 
progressivity of the tax s t ruc t ur e  o f  a given count ry ' s economy . This can 
be eas i ly measured by us ing an e las t i c i ty app roach . Ins t ead of calculating 
the relat ionship as C lark did , the ratio can be calculated as : 
z
t 
= 
/_, 
TR - TR l 
t t -
TRt- 1 
NI - NI l t t -
NI l t -
1 1 00 ] (1 3 ) 
I f  taxa t ion does reduce work e f f o r t  and produc t ivi ty , and spur inflat ion , 
then there should b e  a s i gni ficant rela t ionship b e tween this iden t i ty ( 1 2 )  
and inf lat ion , s ince t h e  more pro gres s ive the t a x  s truc ture , t h e  grea t er 
the value o f  Z .  I f  C la rk ' s theory is  correc t ,  there should b e  a positive 
relat ionship b etween equations (1 2 )  a 1 ' 1d ( 1 0 ) . 
s �mo le Pop ula t ion 
The count ries s e le c t ed for this ana lysis  were bas ed on the fol lowing 
cri teria : 
1 .  The country should have a t ax sys t em collected by the 
central government ;  
2 .  The country was t es t e d  by C la rk ; 
3 .  The country mus t have a non- t o t a l i t arian form o f  government ;  
4. The country should be at p eace throughout the ent ire t ime 
t es t ed ; 
3 3
rn p re sent-day t e rmino logy , this is referr ed to as b racke t creep . 
5 .  The coun t ry has a p roport iona l o r  progr es s ive tax sys t em .  
6 .  There should b e  r eliab l e , conf irmab le data from two 
sources for  that country ; and 
7 .  The country should have achieved a level  o f  economic 
development tha t is  comparab le to the rest  o f  the 
samp le group . 
The firs t c r i t er ion is obvious s ince i t  would b e  di f fi cult  t o  tes t the 
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effects  o f  taxat ion when a tax sys t em do es no t exi s t . Cri t eria 2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  
and 5 were e s t ab lished by C lark . Us ing these criteria wi l l  fac i l i t a t e  
t h e  comp arison o f  this s tudy ' s  resul t s  with t h e  conc lus ions of  C lark . 
The s ixth c r i t erion is ne cess ary to ens ure .a mor e  accurate es t i-
ma t ion of  the relationship . Of ten , nat ions wil l  report  preliminary data 
to  an agency and revis ed dat a  to another , dep end ing on the point in t ime 
the data is reques ted . Therefore , two dif f eren t  a genc ies may report  
diff erent values for  the s ame count ry in a given year . Als o , hones t  
r ep o r t ing mis takes can b e  made in the process o f  pub lishing the dat a .  
Interna tiona l data collec tion is  a n  enormous task , and i t  i s  unreasonab le 
to  assume an agency wi th · limit ed resources wi l l  b e  ab l e  to  f ind a l l  the 
errors b efore pub lica t ion . Thus , as two agencies report  the same s ta t is-
t i c , it  is likely tha t va lue of the s t a t i s tic  i s  ac curat e .  Wi th the 
excep t ion of  the Uni t ed S ta t es , all countries ' data wi ll be verif ied with 
o f f icial publica t ions , if  ava i lab le , or  Unit ed Na t ions pub l icat ions . How-
ever , numb ers wi l l  b e  rounded to the neares t  b i l lion to  avo id specious 
a c curacy . 
The las t  c r i t er i on was es t ab l ished  t o  ens ure some degree o f  c ompar-
ab i l i ty among the result s . In less deve loped countries (LDC ' s ) , government 
po licy t ends to  b e  or ient e d  toward s tab i lizat io n ,  especia l ly price  s t ab i-
lizat ion . Ther e fore , the level o f  price increas es acceptab le in LDC ' s may 
b e  grea ter than is acceptab l e  in deve loped count ries . 
39 
On the basis of thes e s even cri t eria , the count ries s e l e c t ed are 
Canada , Finland , France ,  Germany , I ta ly ,  Sweden , Uni ted Kingdom , and the 
Unit ed S ta t e s . The t es t  p eriod will be 1 9 6 3- 19 8 1  ( 19 years ) . All the 
countries conform to the criteria with the excep t ion of the Uni t ed S t ates , 
who was invo lved in the Viet  Nam conflict  during this t ime . However ,  heavy 
invo lvement only occurred for f ive y ears o f  the t es t  p erio d ; also i t  was 
no t an o f fi cially dec lared war and so wil l  b e  included in the analys is . 
Pre l iminary Model  Tes t s  
The preliminary tes t mod e l  ut i li zed ordinary lea s t  squares con­
tained in the E conome t r i c  S o f tware Package . 34 The variab le G ,  a z ero /one 
dummy variab le , 3 5  is inc luded to t es t  Clark ' s 25 percent theory . A s e cond 
model included dUI1II11.y variab l e  H ,  a t e s t  o f  the Reagan Adminis t ra t ion ' s  1 9  
percent theo ry dis cus s ed i n  Chap ter 1 .  The country t e s t e d  was the Uni ted 
S ta t es f rom 1 9 4 1 to  1 9 8 1 . 36  The number o f  years t es ted was inc reased to 
inc lude the y ears Clark used to  p rove his theory in the Uni t ed S ta t es . 
The models  and preliminary resul t s  are  as f o l l ows : 
34
For programming informa t ion about ESP contact Wes ley P i ckard , 
Syne rgy , Inc . , 2 29 E .  S t . , Washing ton , D. C .  20002 . 
3 5  Values les s  than 2 5  
o r  equa l  t o  2 5  a value o f  1 .  
us ed ins t ead o f  2 5 .  
were ass igned a z ero value , and greater than 
The s ame was p erformed for  H ,  excep t 19 was 
36 See Appendix 2 for data list . The r eader sho uld no t e  the Uni t ed 
S t a t es was invo lved in mi li tary act ion during two o th er p eriods , 1 9 4 1-45 
and 19 50- 5 3 .  
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The z ero s lope-intercep t form was us ed  s ince prior model tes t s  
revealed cons tants very c l o s e  to z ero . 
4 0  
INF = B 1
X + B 2
G ( 1 4 ) 
Coef ficient = O .  l 79X +2 . 1 7G 
SE ( 0 . 0 2 9 )  ( l . 4 3)  
T ( 6 . 1 9 2 )  ( l . 5 1 )  
DW = 1 . 16 R
2 
= 0 . 06 2  F ( l , 39 }  = 2 . 5 7 
N = 4 1  
INF = B 1
X + B 2
H ( 1 5 ) 
Coef fi cient = 0 . 459X -6 . 0 46H 
S E  ( O  . 1 20 )  ( 2 .  7 7) 
T ( 3 .  8 1 2) (-2 . 1 8)  
DW = 0 . 8 34 R
2 
= 0 . 1 1 4 F ( l , 39)  =
 5 . 05 N = 4 1  
The lower l imit o f  the DW tes t for 
K = 2 and N = 40 i s  1 . 2  and bo th 
equations exh ib i t  first o rder autoc
o rrel a tion . For this reason , the 
coefficients  are biased and canno t 
be considered represen t a t ive of the
 
relationship b e tween the variab le
s . The Cochrane-Orcut t i t erat ive 
t echnique 
improved the DW s ta t i s t ic to  1 . 3  a
nd 1 . 2 ,  respect ively , and thes e s t
a t i s t ics 
are in the area of indeterminancy 
( 1 . 2  and 1 . 4  for N = 4 0  and K 
= 2 ) .
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Therefore , an alternat ive method mu
s t be developed t o  t e s t  the relatio
nship 
between the variab les . 
Alternat ive Formulat ion 
As dis c us s ed earlier , an e las t i c i
ty app roach can be us ed t o  t e s t  
the relat ionship b e tween inf lat ion 
and t h e  p ercentage o f  na t ional inco
me 
collected by the government .  By s
ub s t itut ing equations ( 1 2 )  and ( 1 4
)  into 
equat ion ( 1 ) , the mo del becomes : 
RIA = a + B0Z
 + u (
1 6) 
The ini tial  t e s t  run o f  this equa t
i on on the Uni t ed S t ates  revealed m
i ld 
first order auto correlat ion . The C
o chrane-Orcu t t  i terat ive method fu
rther 
3 8Ka t z , ££.• ci t . , p .  27 1 .  
4 1 
improved the Durbin-Watson statistic :9 This statistic was further improved 
by deleting 194 1-196 2 from the model. The improvement is probably due to 
changes in the methods of measuring statistics in the early 1 96 0's. 40 
This deletion did not significantly affect the coefficients, but did 
increase the value of the T statistic. (The final results are included 
in Chapter 4 . )  
Since the model defined in equation (2 1 ) conforms to the assumptions 
of regression analysis better than the previous model, it is the model used 
to test Clark ' s  hypothesis. While the 25 percent limit cannot be statis-
tically verified for any particular country, it can be evaluated by inter-
national comparisons of the results . The data is listed in Appendix 3 and 
it can be seen that some of the countries tested are well above the 25 
percent threshold throughout the test period . By comparing the results 
among the different countries, conclusions about the 25 percent limit can 
be formulated. 
39The use of various lag structures contained in the Econometric 
Software Package did not generate rational numbers but rather, a zero 
correlation matrix . Therefore, the analysis assumes that there is no 
lagged effect . 
4°ilecall from Chapter 2 tha t quality control standards on national 
income accounts were not implemented until the 1960 ' s .  
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUS I ONS 
Res ult s  
The result s o f  the regress ion analy s i s  show there is  no t a d is-
cernib le relat ionship b e tween the rat e  o f in f lation acce leration and the 
elas t i c i ty variab le .  I n  s ix o f  the countries tes ted , the Co chrane-Orcutt 
i t e rat ive technique was necess ary t o  e l iminat e autocorrelat ion : Canada , 
Fin land , France , I t aly , Swi t z e r land and the Uni ted S t at es . In Germany and 
the Uni t ed Kingdom , this adj us tment was no t neces sary ; hence a rho s tatis t ic 
is not reported for  these two coun t ries . All the Durb in-Wa t s on s ta t is t ics 
are greater than the upp er limi t o f  the lower boundary 1 and very c lo s e  to 2 .  
Th ere fore , the coefficients e s t imat ed by the regress ion can b e  cons idered to  
be the  leas t b iased ob tainab l e . 
The T-test  u t i lized  a two-tail t e s t  a t  the 0 . 05 s i gnifi cance leve l . 
The two tail  t es t  is  necessary s ince  s ome T values are p o s i t ive and some 
are nega t ive . The c rit ical values are � 2 . 131 for  1 5  d f . and � 2 . 120 for 
1 6  df .
2 
I f  the T value of a co e f fic ient lies in b e tween the p o s i t ive and 
negat ive cri t ical va lues , that c o e f f i c ient is no t s ignificant ly di f ferent 
1
The Durb in-Wat s on boundaries are : 
N 
K = 1 16 
K = 1 17  
Katz , o p .  c i t . p 2 71 .  
7
tb id . , p . 267 .  
DL 
DU 
. 84 1 . 09 
. 8 7 1 . 1 0 
4'?.. 
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from zero ; the variable i s  considered t o  b e  a n  insi gnificant inf l uence on 
the rate of inflat ion accelerat ion . I f  the T va lue lies out s i de the 
cri tical region , then the variable  i s  considered s i gnificant . 
The F-t e s t  is us ed t o  confirm the T-t es t .
3 The F- crit i ca l  value 
for ( 1 ,  1 4 )  d f . is 4 . 6  and for ( 1 ,  1 5 )  d f .  is 4 . 5 4 .  I f  the F-va lues 
genera t ed by the regres s ion are grea t e r  than the F-cri t i ca l  values , the 
coe f f icients are cons idered to  be a s igni fi cant in f l uenc e  upon the 
dependent variab l e . 
The results be low are presented in a lphab e t i ca l  order : 
Canada 
R
2 
= 0 . 09 6  
Fin land 
R2 = 0 . 0249  
France 
2 R = 0 . 0 1 8 1  
RIA = 
SE  
T 
6 7 . 82 - 0 . 4 32X 
( 4 3 . 6 3 ) (0 . 3 5 3 )  
(1 . 5 5 )  (-, 1 . 1 2 2 )  
DW = 1 .  7 8  rho = 0 . 0 2 8  
RIA = 10 .  7 + 0 . 00 1 56X 
SE (1 2 . 6 9 )  � ( 0 � 00 3 14)  
T ( 0 . 8 4 6 )  (0 . 4 9 7 )  
DW = 1 . 748 rho = 0 . 0 8 9  
RIA = - 1 6 . 1 9  + 0 . 2 4 8X 
SE ( 5 5 . 2 7 ) ( 0 . 49 2 )  
T ( 0 . 5 0 )  ("".0 . 2 9 )  
DW = 2 . 38 rho = 0 . 0 1 0 
N = 1 6  F ( l , 1 4 )  = 1 . 49 
N = 1 6  F ( 1 ,  1 4 )  = 0 .  3 5  7 
N = 1 6  F ( l ,  1 4 ) = 0 . 2 5 7  
3F = T2 • F-c ritica l values are at the 0 . 0 5 s i gni ficance level . 
Ibid . , p . 2 6 9 . 
Germany 
R2 = 0 . 22 
Italy 
R
2 = 0 . 0 1 9  
Swi t z erland 
R
2 
= 0 . 0 5 
RIA = 74 . 0 2 - 0 . 5 06X 
S E  (3 1 . 3) ( 0 . 244)  
T ( - 2 . 0 6 )  ( 2 . 35 )  
DW = 2 . 1 4  rho = N/R  
RIA = 1 8 . 1 7 7  + . 0000290X 
S E  ( 1 7 . 8 3) ( . 00 0 1 4 2 )  
T ( 1 . 0 19 )  ( 0 � 20 3) 
DW = 1 . 99 rho = 0 . 1 42 
RIA = 38 . 7  + . 00 4 2 5X 
SE ( 4 1 . 0 ) ( 0 . 104)  
T ( 1 .  1 0 9 ) ( 0 . 2 0 3 )  
DW = 1 . 9 3  rho = 0 . 2 3 
Uni ted King_dom 
R
2 
= 0 . 0 3 7  
Uni ted S t at es 
RIA = 3 . 3 7 + 0 . 1 3 8X 
SE ( 2 6 . 6) (0 . 1 8) 
T ( 0 . 1 2 )  c o ; -1 6 6 )  
DW = 1 . 6 7  rho = N/R 
RIA = 5 . 9 8  + 0 . 09 5X 
SE ( 1 5 . 7 ) (0 . 1 0 8 )  
T ( 0 . 3 79 )  ( 0 . 8 7 8) 
N = 1 7  
N = 1 6  
N = 1 6  
N = 1 7  
R
2 
= 0 . 0 4 8 4  DW = 1 . 9 3 rho = 0 . 00 7 32 N = 1 7  
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F ( l ,  -. 15 ) -�= �"4 � 2 7  
F (l , 1 4 )  0 . 2 80 
F ( l ,  1 4 )  = 0 . 7 5 9  
F ( l ,  1 5 )  = 0 . 5 8 
F ( l ,  1 5 )  = 0 . 762  
As thes e s ta t i s t i c s  indicat e ,  there is  not a s igni fi cant relation-
ship b e tween the degree of p rogressivi ty of government receip ts and p ercent 
changes in the rate of inf lat ion . Al l of the T- t e s ts reveal the variab les 
do not exert a s i gnifican t  inf luence over the dep enden t variab le . 
The T-va lues and the F-values fai l the s i gni ficance t e s t  at the 0 . 0 5 
s i gn i fican ce leve l .  Even i f  the variab les were s igni fican t , the R
2 
values 
4 5  
reveal only a sma l l  port ion o f  RIA i s  exp lained b y  the model . S ince thes e 
variables exaggera t e  changes in p ri c es and t ax r evenue s a s  a percent  o f  
nat ional inc ome , i t  i s  not l ikely that Clark ' s  hypothes is i s  co rrec t . 
An examination o f  the data in Appendix 2 confirms Clark ' s theory 
is incorrect . The countries wi l l  b e  dis cus s ed in two categories . The 
f i rs t  cat egory consi s t s  o f  count ries that have co llected over 30 perc ent 
of nat i onal income in the form of tax receip ts  during the t e s t  p eriod 
( 1 9 6 3- 1 980) . Thi s group cons i s t s  o f  Canada , Finland , France ,  Germany , 
I taly and the Uni t e d  Kingdom . In the second group , the countries are 
tho s e  who s e  rat ios have been less than 30 p ercent during mos t  of the tes t 
p eriod . The lat ter group cons i s t s  o f  only two countries : the Uni ted S tates 
and Swi t z er land . 
Cat egory 1 Coun t ries 
In addi t ion to  the s tatis t ical simi lari t i e s , the co untries in this 
category all have par liamentary fo rms of  gove rnment and have mixed economic 
sy s t ems . Wi th the excep t ion o f  France , all  the countries had t ax ratios in 
the low thirt ies in 1 9 6 3 ; and the rat ios then increased t o  the mid-forties 
by the end o f  the 1 9 70 ' s .  France had a cons iderab ly high er t ax ratio 
( 4 1 . 1  percen t )  in 1 96 3 .  Desp i t e  this rat i o , the growth o f  the government 
s ector in France has been s imi lar to the o ther countries in this catego ry .  
I n  Canada , 4 from 1 9 6 9 t o  1 9 7 9 , the tax rat i o  remained b e tween 40-4 1 
percent . Y e t  dur ing this t ime , inflat ion varied from 1 . 9  percent t o  1 1 . 1 
percent . In fact , when the rat io did increase during this period , such as 
4
Recall  that C lark b e lieved the Brit ish Dominions had a lower tax­
ab le limi t o f  1 8  p ercent . I f  this ratio had been used , the  c omparison is 
more s t riking . 
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the 19 70- 19 7 1  int erval , the inf lat ion rate fell  from 4 . 5  percent t o  2 . 9  
percent ( a  decrease o f  36 . 2  percent ) . Then in 1 9 7 2 , when the t ax rat io 
fell s li gh t ly , the in flat ion rat e  rose to  4 . 2  percent , rep r es enting a 45 
percent increase in the rat e  o f  inf lat ion . The two y ears with the large s t  
increas es i n  the inf lat ion rat e  were 1 9 6 6  and 1 9 7 3 ; i n  1 96 6 ,  t h e  ratio 
increased s li ght ly and in 1 9 7 3 ,  in flat ion f e l l  by 0 . 6 p ercent age p o ints . 5 
On the who l e ,  the Canad ian experience contradicts Clark ' s theo retical 
relat ionship . 
F inland
6 
represents the country with the h i gh es t degree o f  s o c iali-
zat ion in the t e s t  group . The years with the larges t percent declines in 
the inflat ion rat es were 1 9 6 5 , 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 9  and 1 9 7 8 ;  yet , the ratio increased 
in all thes e years with the excep t ion o f  1 9 7 8 . The highes t tax ratio in 
the Finnish data s e t , 48 . 9  perc ent in 1 9 7 6 , coincides wi th a 2 2 . 2  percent 
dec l ine in the rate of  inf lat ion . For the years 1 9 6 3  and 1 9 6 4 , the tax 
rat io reached its lowes t point o f 35  p ercent ; yet , the inf lat ion rat e rose 
f rom 5 . 2  percent t o  9 . 9 percent (a 90  percent increase in the inf lat ion 
rat e ) . While 1 9 7 1  and 1 9 7 8  confo rm to  C lark ' s theory , tho se years do not 
outweigh the other 15 years which are contrary to C lark ' s hypo thes is . 
France i s  particularly important s inc e C lark r e lied on this country 
t o  p rove his theory when i t  was f irs t pub lished . Franc e has co l l ec t ed wel l 
over 40  p ercen t  of  i t s  nat ional income in t he form o f  tax revenues in every 
year since 1 96 3 .  Yet  during this t ime , Franc e has exp erienced levels o f  
inf lat ion as  low as  2 . 5  p ercent and as high as 1 0 . 7  percent . In 1 9 6 3  and 
5This sma l l  of a change is not like ly to be within the realm o f  
meas urement accuracy . 
6
Fin land is another country Clark b e l ieved t o  have a lower taxab le 
limi t . Again i f  18 o r  1 9  percent had b een used  ins t ead of 25 perc ent , the 
ana lys is b ecomes more striking . 
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1964 , the tax rat io grew s li ght ly f rom 4 1 . 1 p ercent t o  4 2 . 1 perc ent ; 
however ,  the inf la t i on rate declined by 29 . 1  percent . When the rate o f  
inf lation declined 1 4  percent in 1 9 7 5  and almo s t  1 8  percent in 1 9 76 , the 
tax rat io was 4 5 . 7  percen t  and 4 8 . 3  percen t , resp ect ively . In  1 9 7 8 , the 
rat e of inf lat ion declined by 10 percent and the tax rat io r emained at  
4 7  percent . When the rat i o  ros e t o  5 1  percent in 1 9 80 ,  the in f lat ion 
ra t e  dropped by 1 . 8  p ercent . Altho ugh 1 9 6 8  and 1 9 6 9  do conform t o  C lark ' s 
theo ry , the s e  two years do no t outweigh the French evidence again s t  the 
theory . 
The data for Germany is the mos t  interes t ing . Firs t ,  i f  the 
regress ion result s had been evalua t ed at  the 0 . 2  s i gnificanc e level rather 
than the . 00 2  l evel , Germany would have been the only coun t ry where the 
relat ionship is s ignificant . The negat ive s i gn of the coeffic ient ind i­
ca t es that as overall  tax c o l l e c t ions b ecome more p ro gres s ive , the rat e 
o f  inf lat ion accelerat ion declined . In fact , Germany has exp erienced the 
mos t  modera t e  l eve ls o f  inf lat ion o f  the countries in this cat egory . 
Rej ect ing Clark ' s  theory on the bas i s  o f  the r egres s ion can b e  
confirmed with Germany ' s  data . The p eriods with the large s t  decline in 
inf lat ion were 19 66- 1 9 6 7 and 1 9 7 5- 1 9 7 6 . In the first  p eriod , the rat e 
o f  in f la t ion dropped from 3 . 3  p er c en t  to  1 . 4  percent ( a  5 7 . 5  percent 
decline) , yet the tax rat io remained at 40 percent . In the s econd t ime 
perio d , the ra t io increased from 4 7 . 4  percent to  48 . 9  p ercent , while the 
in flat ion rate  f e l l  from 5 . 9  percent to 4 . 5  p erc ent (a 2 3 . 7 percent decline) . 
In fact , from 1 9 7 5  to  1 9 7 8 , the ra t io remained at 4 8  percent and the inf la­
t ion rat e dropped from 5 . 9  percent to 2.6 percent . 
The p e riod in which the rat e  o f  in f lation had the larges t increas e 
in I ta ly wa s 1 9 6 8- 1 9 6 9 . In 1 9 6 9 , the ra t e  of  inflat ion rose by 1 6 3 . 6  
percen t . However ,  the t ax ra t io f e l l  from 3 3 . 7  percent in 1 9 6 8  t o  3 2 . 8  
in 1 9 6 9 .  The two years in whi ch inf l ation was a t  i t s  highes t l evel o f  
4 8  
1 9  percent were 1 9 7 4  and 1 9 7 7 ,  and the ratio had increas ed i n  a manner 
cons is t ent with C lark ' s theory . The years 1 9 7 5  and 1 9 7 8  exp e ri enced s ub­
s t antial dec lines in the rate o f  inflat ion and the t ax ratio cont inued to 
increase .  Therefore , the I talian experience does not app ear t o  b e  con­
sis t ent with C lark ' s theory . 
The Unit ed Kingdom ' s  t ax ra t io was a t  its  l owes t  l eve l , 34 p e rcent , 
during 1 9 6 3 and 1 9 6 4 . At this t ime , the rat e  o f  inf lat ion increas ed 1 2 3 . 5  
p ercent . Whi l e  the rat i o  cont inued t o  rise in 1 9 6 6  and 1 9 6 7 ,  the in flat ion 
rate dec l ined by 22 percent in 1 9 6 6  and by 34 percent in 1 96 7 .  From 1 9 6 8  
t o  1 9 7 2 ,  the inf lat ion rate shi f ted correspondingly with the tax rat io . 
In 1 9 7 5 , the ra t i o  reached i t s  hi ghes t point , 4 8 , 6 ,  and the inf lat ion rate 
reached 2 4 . 2  percen t . However , from 1 9 7 6  to 19 79 , the tax rat io remained 
very near 44  percent and inf lat ion f luc tua t ed f rom 1 5 . 9  perc ent to 9 per­
c ent . While s ix o f  the s eventeen years t es t ed in the Uni t ed Kingdom are 
cons i s t en t  with Clark ' s  theory , the o ther eleven years do not weighfavor­
ab ly with Clark . 
Catego ry 2 Coun t ries 
The two countries in this cat egory , the Uni t ed S t at es and Swi t zer­
land , have had relative ly low levels o f  tax revenues as a p ercent o f  nat ional 
income . However ,  these count ries share other c onnnon charac t eris tics . Firs t , 
b o th countries are populated by peoples with divers e cult ura l background s . 
Becaus e the act ions o f  governments mus t  app ea l to  thes e d ive rse groups , 
government p o licy has t ended toward the modera t e  range o f  the p o l i t i cal 
spect rum.  S econdly , the financial sector composes a very large portion of  
the Gros s Na t ional P roduc t o f  both countries . They are also  ab le to  draw 
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s ub s t antial amount s o f  foreign inves tment monies . As a resul t , there is  
a smaller need for government s ub s idies o r  ownership of  product ive res ourc es 
to provide s o c ially neces sary goods and s ervices . This free marke t o rien­
tat ion has provided the po l i t ical pressure to keep t axes low , r es ul t ing in 
a lower t ax rat io . 
Swi t z erland ' s  tax rat io remained c los e to  2 5  percen t  from 1 9 6 3  t o  
1 9 6 5  and inf la t ion r emain ed around 3 . 5  percent . The ratio inc reased f rom 
26 percent in 1 9 6 7 to 2 7 . 6  percent in 19 6 8 .  Y e t  the rat e o f  inf l at ion 
declined by 1 3  percen t  in 1 9 6 7 and by 4 2 . 5  percent in 1 96 8 . A s imilar 
situat ion o c c urs in the period of  1 9 69- 1 9 74 .  When the ratio increas e d  
from 32 . 1  percent i n  1 9 74  t o  34 . 7  percent i n  1 9 7 5 , the inf lat ion r a t e  
dropped by 30 . 9  percent . I n  1 9 7 6 , when t h e  t a x  rat io increas ed t o  36 . 3  
percent , the inf lation rat e  dropped f rom 6 . 7  percent t o  1 . 7  percent ( a  7 4  
p ercent decline) . While t h e  rat io r emained a t  36 percent i n  1 9 7 7  and 19 78 , 
the inf lat ion rate dropped by 8 8 . 3  percent in 1 9 7 7  and by 400 percent in 
1 9 7 8 . When the tax rat io f e l l  t o  3 5  percent in 1 9 79 , the rat e o f  inf lat ion 
rose by 260  percent o f  i t s  1 9 7 8  l evel . E l even o f  the s event een y ears do 
no t conform to C lark ' s theory . 
The tax rat io in the Uni t ed S tat es did not reach the 2 5  percent 
mark unt i l  1 9 7 8 and has no t subs tant ia l ly exceeded this ratio . Therefore , 
i t  is difficult  t o  determine i f  in f lat ion do es result when the rat io exceeds 
25 percent of nat i onal income . However , the ra t io did reach 2 6 . 7  percent 
in 1 9 8 1 and the rat e  of inf lat ion dropped from 1 1 . 0 perc ent in 1 9 8 0  to  9 . 0  
percent in 1 9 8 1 ( an 1 8  percent decline) . Clark uses the lat e 1 9 40 ' s  to 
prove his theo ry in the Uni t ed S ta t es , and in 1 9 4 6  when the rat io reached 
25 percent , inf lat ion did no t increas e .  Yet in 1 9 4 7  when the rat io declined 
5 0  
to 2 2  p ercent , inf la t ion rose from 2 . 2  percent to  8 . 5  p ercent .
7 
The l i t t l e  
evidence which d o e s  exi s t  s eems t o  contradict h i s  theory : Inf lat ion has 
decl ined when the tax rat i o  has exceeded 25 percent and the rate o f  inf la-
tion has risen when the ratio was under 25 percent . 
As d i s cuss ed in Chap ter 1 ,  recent s upply-side economi s t s  b e l i eve 
that when t ax revenues exc eed 1 9  percent o f  na tiona l  income ( in the Uni t ed 
S ta t es ) , inflat ion wi l l  result . Only once s ince 1 9 4 4  has the tax ratio in 
the Uni t ed S ta t es b een s i gnif i cant ly less  than 19 percent , that b eing in 
1 9 5 0  when the rat i o  was 1 6 . 7  percent , and the inf la tion rat e was 0 . 0 1 per-
cent . When the ratio inc reas ed t o  1 8 . 9  perc ent in 19 5 1 ,  the rat e  o f  in f la-
t ion ros e to  7 . 9  pe rc en t . However ,  when the rat io ros e to 23 percent in 
1 9 5 2 , the ra t e  o f  inf lat ion fe l l  to 2 . 1  percent . The rat io rema ined at 
2 3  p ercent in 1 9 5 3  and 1 9 5 4 , ye t in f lat ion did no t even exis t .  From 1 9 56 
to  1 9 6 6 , the rat i o  r emained n ear 2 1  percent , yet the highes t rat e of  inf la-
t ion was 2 . 7  percent , the lowes t b eing 0 . 0 8 perc ent . Whi l e  prices do ris e 
s ligh t ly
8 
when the rat io is over 1 9  percent , they also  rise when the ratio 
is less  than 1 9  percen t . 
Conc luding Remarks 
On the basis  o f  the dat a , there is no t a s i gnif icant relat ionship 
b etween inflation and tax r evenues as  a p ercent of nat iona l income . There 
does no t appear to  be  any magical ra t io at which in flation wi l l  nec es sarily 
result . While inf la t ion does o c cur when tax revenues exceed 2 5  percent o f  
na t i ona l income , i t  a l so occurs  at less  than 2 5  percent ( o r  19  percent ) . 
7
This a ls o  s ugges t s  the meas u rement error  in Clark ' s  data contains 
a larger degree o f  measurement erro r than expec t ed by this economist . 
8
Af ter the exp e rience in the , 1 9 70 ' s ,  i t  is  di fficult  to cons ider 
inf l a t ion ra tes less than 1 . 0  perceqt a s er ious prob lem.  
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No t only is Clark ' s  hypo thes is rej ect ed , but also the premises  on whi ch 
the Reagan Admin i s t ra t ion has bas ed i t s  f i s ca l  measures are also  r ej e c t ed 
by this analy si s . 
Price s tab ility
9 does  no t s e em to o ccur a t  any part icular tax 
rat io . However , it  does s e em to  o c cur more  o f t en when the rat io is  s tab l e .  
I t  could b e  that changes in the t ax sys t em  caus e price shocks ; these sho cks 
could resul t as increas es or decreases in prices , depending on the type o f  
change , the leve l o f  income and i t s  d is t r ibut ion , and the a t t i tude toward 
the t ax reform in que s t ion .  
The rate o f  inf lat ion appears t o  b e  great er in the mid- 1 9 70 ' s  than 
in any o ther t ime period for a l l  the coun t ries t e s t ed .  Thes e  hi gh l evels 
o f  inf la t ion do no t appear t o  be related t o  any particular government act ion . 
Rather , these ra t es seem to b e  more c los ely associated with changes in the 
pricing po licies of the Organizat ion of P e t ro l eum Export ing Countri es 
(OPEC} . However ,  OPEC should no t b e  used as  a political s capegoat for the 
e conomic woes of o ther non-memb er nat i ons . P erhaps the failure of govern-
ments  to ins t itut e effective ant i-in f l a t ion p o l ic ies to count er OPEC price 
changes is a more approp ria t e  place  at  whi ch t o  point the f inger o f  b lame . 
Fo r the na t ions considered , the rat e  o f  inf lat ion and the rate o f  
inf lat ion accelerat ion d o  no t appear t o  b e  a n  ac cura t e  indicato r  o f  when a 
nat ion has reached i t s  economic t axab le limit . This does not p r eclude the 
exis t ence of an e conomic indicator of this limit . A nat ion ' s taxab l e  
capa c i ty i s  mo s t  likely dependent upon many ins t itut ional fac t o rs , such 
as the kind of tax used , how the tax is collected , how r evenues are spent , 
9Price s tab ility i s  a rather subj ect ive phras e .  Here i t  refers 
when the ra t e  of change in the p rice index is f rom - 3 . 0  percent to +3 . 0  
percent . 
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the dist ribut ion o f  a f t er-tax income , and the gen eral s t a t e  o f  the economy . 
Fur ther res earch into  the area o f  taxab l e  capa c i ty c ould great ly facili-
tate government budgetary p lanning and economic p o l i cy formulat ion . 
SUMMARY 
Colin C l ark ' s the o ry o f  inf la t i on has had a profound e ffect  on 
present-day e conomic theory concerning t axation policy . Whi le his belief  
that inf la tion occurred when a l l  tax revenues exceeded 2 5  percent of  
nat ional income was rej e c t e d  by his cont emporaries in  the  1 9 40 ' s , s upp ly-
side economists  inc o rporat e C lark ' s theory int o  their proposals for 
curing the unemp loyment and in f la t i on of  the 19 70 ' s  and 1 9 80 ' s .  These 
proposals gained popular s uppo rt and resul t ed in the elect ion of P resident 
Ronald Reagan who imp lemented such proposals . The purpo se o f  this s t udy 
is t o  determine the vera c i ty o f  C lark ' s  theory . 
On the basis o f  his s t a t i s t ical  analy s is C lark conc luded that high 
levels o f  taxat ion t ransmi t t ed inf la tion t o  the priva t e  s ector  through 
wages in peacetime , non- t o t a l i tarian nations . He argued that workers , if  
not  compensated for  income " lo s t "  through t axa t ion , would choose  more 
leis ure time or become less p roduct ive . As f i rms a t t emp t to reduce tax-
ab le income , they lose their " reis tance" to  wo rker ' s  demands for higher 
wages , since this higher wage increases p roduc t ion costs  and thereby 
reduces taxab le income . Thus , fewer goods are avai lab le at higher pri ces . 
However , this analys is  was rej e c t e d  in the 19 50 ' s  by economis ts 
such as Walter Heller , Jos eph Pechman , Thomas Meyer , and Francis Bator 
for s everal reas ons . Ini t ia l ly , there was no t an int ernat ional ly ( o r  
nat iona l ly )  ac cep t ed metho d o f  c o l lect ing nat i onal income data  prior to 
1 9 6 0 ; the accuracy of C lark ' s data was unknown . Second ly , tax revenues 
greater than 25 percent o f  nat iona l income c oincided with def lat ions almost  
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a s  of ten as  inf lation , making C la rk ' s  conc lus ions appear unfounded . 
Thi rdly , Clark ' s  theo ry was not  cons i s t ent with bus iness and worker 
behavior at  that t ime . Many s t udies , mos t  not ab ly Thomas S aunder ' s  
study o f  work ef fort , showed busine s s  execut ives worked harder or  j us t  
a s  hard a f t e r  t a x  increases  s ince non-monet ary c ons iderations were a s  
important t o  wo rkers . Corporat ions , o n  t h e  who l e , d i d  not appear t o  
engage i n  more o r  less  was t ed  p ract ices when faced with tax increase s . 
Fourth ly , Clark ' s  theo ry presumed wage inc reas es came before price  
increases when the  opp o s i t e  appeared t o  be  more common . Fi f th ly , those 
who at t emp t ed t o  confirm Cla rk ' s  theory wi th regr s s ion ana lysis , were 
unab l e  to find a s ignifi cant rela t i onship between inf la t ion and t ax 
revenues as a p ercent o f  nat ional income . 
C lark ' s  theo ry was t e s t e d  in this s tudy with the use o f  regres­
s ion analys is . Th e dep endent variab le , inflat ion , was measured as the 
p ercent change in the consumer price index . The consmner price  index 
was chos en becaus e it is a b road-based index that is repres ent at ive o f  
commodity and s ervic e  prices and exc lud es labor c o s t s . Measurement error 
was minimized by the us e of annual CPI dat a .  The independent var iab l e  is 
the ratio  o f  t o t a l  tax receipts  as a p ercent of the o f fi cially repo rted 
nat i onal income . The preliminary run o f  the t es t  was p erformed on the 
Uni t ed States f rom 1 9 4 1 - 1 9 8 1 using o rdinary leas t squares contained in 
the Econome tric S o f tware Package . Aut ocorrelation appeared in the 
regre s s ion and at temp ts to correc t this fai led . 
Th e mo di fied t es t  model us ed the rate o f  inflat ion accelerat ion 
( p ercent change in the in fla t i on ra t e) as the dependent variab l e . Th is 
dependent variab l e  exaggerates  the magnitude of price changes , making the 
relat ionship mo re like ly . The independent variab le rep res ent ed the 
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e la s t i city c o e f f i c ient o f  t o t a l  t a x  receip ts  to  national income ( percent 
change in taxes d ivided by percent change in nat iona l income , expres s e d  
as a percentage) . This independent variab le is far more descrip t ive o f  
the int erac t ion b e tween t a x  revenues and nat i ona l income . The model  was 
used to t e s t  Clark ' s  theory in Canada , Finland , Franc e ,  Germany , I t aly , 
Swi t zerland , the Uni t ed Kingdom , and the Uni t ed S ta t es from 1 9 6 3- 1 9 8 1 .  
The regress ion results  show that there i s  no relat ionship b e tween the 
rate o f  inf la t ion accelerat ion and the elas t i c i ty of total tax receipts 
and nat ional income . 
A country by count ry analysis  con firms that in flat ion is  no t any 
mo re or less  s evere when tax revenues exceed 2 5  percent of  national income . 
Canada , Finland , France , Germany , I t a ly and the Uni t ed Kingdom all have 
the ir lowes t ratio at 30 percent during the tes t p eriod and all  experi­
enced simi lar growth rat es in the p ub lic s ec t o r . Yet thes e count ries 
exp erienc e vo latile price f luc t uat ions ( and cons equent ly inf lat ion rates ) 
that do not o ft en coincide with increas es in the tax ratio . In fact , 
Germany , with one o f  the highe s t  tax rat io s  in this group , has had re la­
t ive ly s tab le prices during many o f  the years t es ted . Th e Uni ted Kingdom , 
with the s lowe s t  growth in t ax revenues as a percent o f  nat ional income , 
has experienced the highest  rat es o f  inf lat ion . 
The las t two c ount ri e s , Swi t z erland and the Uni t ed S ta t es , conform 
less frequent ly with Clark ' s the o ry . From 1 9 6 3  t o  1 9 80 , Swi t z erland ' s  
tax revenues have grown from 2 5  p ercent o f  nat ional income to 35  percent ; 
yet  prices have been relat ive ly s tab le during a good port ion o f  the test 
pe riod . The United S ta t es reached the 2 5  p ercent tax ratio only recently 
and has experienc ed inf lat ion a t  rat io s  less  than 2 5  percent quite o ft en .  
Neither country p rovides evidenc e t o  s upport C lark ' s  theory . 
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O n  the bas is o f  the regres s ion ana ly s i s  and the country b y  count ry 
s ta t i s t ical analys is , this s tudy finds l i t t l e  evidence to support C lark ' s  
theory o f  inf la t ion . For thi s reas on , the s tudy reconnnends a re-examina-
t ion o f  a l l  policies that have been imp l emented  on the bas i s  of C lark ' s  
theo ry o r  o ther s imilar theories o f  inf la t ion . 
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T ab le 1 
Re tai l P ri ces Taxation as  a 
Coun t ry Year 19 1 3  o r  1 9 1 4  Pe rcent o f  
= 10 0  Nat ional Income 
France 1 9 2 2  2 9 6  2 5 . 4  
1 9 2 3  3 3 3  2 3 . 8 
1 9 2 4  36 9 2 1 .  9 
1 9 2 5  400 20 . 1 
1 9 2 6  5 0 5  2 1 . 2  
1 9 2 7  5 1 4 2 4 . 9  
19 2 8  5 19 2 5 . 2  
1 9 2 9  5 56 2 5 . 6  
19 30 5 8 1  25 . 0  
1 9 3 1  5 6 9  26 . 1  
1 9 3 2  5 26 2 6 . 3 
1 9 3 3  5 2 0  26 . 5  
1 9 34  5 1 5 2 8 . 8  
19 35 482 2 6 . 9  
1 9 3 6  5 0 7  2 4 . 6  
1 9 3 7  6 19 1 9 . 6  
1 9 38 6 9 7  2 1 . 3 
B e lgium 1 9 2 5  5 19 1 4 . 2 
1 9 2 6  6 2 1  16 . 5  
19 2 7  7 7 1  1 7 . 3 
1 9 2 8  79 8 1 8 . 2 
1 9 2 9  84 7 1 7 . 3 
1 9 30 869 1 3 . 1 
Great Britain 1 9 2 5  1 76 2 2 . 1 
1 9 2 6  1 7 2  2 3 . l 
19 2 7  1 6 8  2 3 . l 
1 9 2 8  1 66 2 3 . 0  
1 9 29 16 4 2 2 . 0  
I t aly 1 9 26 5 1 7  1 5 . 3  
1 9 2 7  4 7 2 1 6 . 8  
1 9 2 8  4 38 2 3 . 6 
1 9 2 9  4 46 2 2 . 0 
Japan 1 9 2 5  2 1 8 1 4 . 7  
19 26 1 9 9  1 4 . 9  
1 9 2 7  1 89 1 4 . 8  
19 2 8  1 84 1 4 . 7 
1 9 2 9  1 82 1 4 . 7  
S o urce : Co lin Clark "P ub li c  Finance and Changes In the Va lue of  Money . "  
E conomi c Journal , Vo l  LV , No .  2 2 0 . (New York , NY :  Macmi l lan and 
Co . ,  1 9 4 5 ) , p .  3 7 5 . 
Tab l e  2 
Taxat i on as 
Rat e  o f  Marginal Percent o f  
Produc t iv i ty P r i c e  Price Nat ional 
Country P eriod Growth Increas e Increase Inc ome 
Aus t ralia 1 9 2 4- 3 1  2 . 0  - 1 . 5  0 . 7 1 5 . 0  
1 9 54-5 7 2 . 0  1 . 2  0 . 8  2 6 . 0  
Aus tria 1 9 5 3- 5 7  2 . 0  6 . 0 . 6  2 9 . 7  
Belgium 1 9 4 9- 5 7  2 . 1 2 . 5  1 . 2  2 1 . 1 
Bri tain 1 9 2 3-38 1 . 2  . 5  . 5  2 1 . 0  
1 9 49 -5 8  0 . 9  3 . 6  . 7  2 6 . 6  
Canada 1 9 2 2-35  1 . 9  - 2 . 4  . 6  1 7 . 9  
19 5 3- 5 7  1 . 9  2 . 1 . 6  3 1 . 2  
Denmark 1 9 2 3- 39 1 . 2  1 . 0  1 . 1 20 . 0  
1 9 4 9- 5 7  1 . 2  5 . 2  1 . 0  2 8 . 6  
Finland 1 9 30-5 7 2 . 0  - 1 . 2  1 . 1  26 . 0  
France 1 9 2 5- 35 2 . 3  3 . 9  . 3  2 7 . 0  
1 9 50-5 7 2 . 3  5 . 5  . 6  40 . 9  
Germany 1 9 2 7- 38 1 . 6  . 4  . 2  2 3 . 0  
1 9 52-58  1 . 4  5 . 4  1 . 0  4 3 . 6  
I taly 1 9 2 2- 3 5  . 7  -2 . 7  --- 2 5 . 0  
1 9 5 0 - 5 7  3 . 8  1 . 8  • 1 30 . 0  
Japan 1 9 2 7-38 1 . 4  - . 4  . 4  1 5 . 6  
Netherlands 1 9 4 9-5 7 2 . 2  - . 4  . 4  35 . 0  
New Zealand 1 9 2 7-38 2 . 2  - . 7 . 8 1 8 . 0  
1 9 4 7- 5 7 2 . 2  2 . 3  . 7  3 1 . 6  
No rway 1 9 48-5 7 2 . 6  3 . 2  • 3 35 . 3  
Sweden 1 9 2 3-29  1 . 4  0 --- 1 9 . 0  
1 9 30- 39 3 . 0  . 5  . 3  1 9 . 0  
1 9 46-58 3 . 0  . 5  . 3  2 9 . 9  
Swi t z erland 19 3 1- 5 7  2 . 1 . 8  . 3  20 . 0  
Uni t ed S tat es 1902-32  2 . 3 - . 9 . 4  1 1 . 0  
1 9 3 3-58  2 . 1 3 . 0  . 4  3 1 . 3  
Source : Employment , Growth and Price  Levels , He arings b e fo re the 
Joint E qonomi c Connni t t ee , 86 th  Congres s , O c t ob e r  1 ,  1 9 5 9 , Washingt on , D. C . : 
United  S tates Gove rnment P rint ing O f fice , p .  2 4 80 . 
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YEAR CP I a I NFb R I AC -- nol • l OO - -
1 9 4 1  44 . 1  4 . 9 -- -
1 942 48 . 8  1 0 . 6  - - -
1 94 3  5 1 . 8  6 . 1  ---
1 944 5 2 . 7  1 . 7 -- -
1 94 5  5 3  . .  2 . 2 - --
1 946 58 . 5  8 . 5  - --
1 94 7  6 6 . 9  1 4 . 3  ---
1 948 72 . 1  7 . 7  - - -
1 949 7 1 . 4  -0 . 1 ---
1 9 5 0  7 2  . 1  0 . 1 - --
1 9 5 1 7 7 . 8  7 . 9 - - -
1 9 5 2  7 9 . 5  2 . 1 -- -
1 9 5 3  80 . 1  0 . 0 7  ---
1 95 4 80 . 5  0 . 049 - --
1 9 5 5  80 . 2  - . 0 3  ---
1 95 6 8 1 . 4  1 . 4 - --
1 9 5 7  8 4 . 3 3 . 5  - --
1 9 58 86 . 6  2 . 7  ---
1 95 9  8 7 . 3  . 08 - - -
1 960 88 . 7 1 . 6 - --
1 9 6 1  89 . 6  1 . 0 ---
1 96 2  90 . 6  1 . 1 - - -
1 96 3 9 1 . 7  1 . 1 - - -
1 9 64 92 . 9  1 . 3 1 8 . 2  
1 9 6 5  9 4 . 5  1 . 6 2 3  . 1  
1 96 6  9 7  . 2  2 . 7 6 8 . S  
1 96 7 1 00 . 0  2 . 8 3 . 7  
1 968 1 04 . 2  4 . 0  4 2 . 9  
1 96 9  1 09 . 8 5 . 0 2 5 . 0  
1 9 70 1 1 6 . 3  6 . 0 2 0 . 0  
1 9 7 1 1 2 1 . 3 4 . 1  - 3 1 . 7  
1 9 72 1 2 5 . 3  3 .  1 - 2 4 . 4  
1 9 7 3  1 3 3 . 1  5 . 9 90 . 3  
1 9 7 4  1 47 . 7 9 . 8 66 . 1 
1 9 7 5  1 6 1 . 2  8 . 4 - 1 4 . 3  
1 9 7 6  1 70 . 5  5 . 4 - 3 5 . 7 
1 9 7 7  1 8 1 . 5  6 . 0 1 1 .  1 
1 9 78 1 95 . 3  7 . 0 1 6 . 7  
1 9 79 2 1 7 . 7  1 0 . 0 42 . 9  
1 980 2 4 7 . 0  1 1 . 0 1 0 . 0 
1 98 1  2 72 . 3  9 . 0 - 1 8 . 2  
L'NI TED S TATES 
TRd -
8 . 6  
1 4 . 3 
2 3 . S  
4 4 . 2  
4 5 . 2 
39 . 3  
38 . 3  
4 1 . 7  
3 9 . 4  
3 9 . 5 
5 1 . 6  
6 6 . 2  
6 9 . 5 
6 9 . 7 
6 5 . 4  
7 4 . 5 
7 9 . 9  
7 9 . 6  
7 9 . 2  
9 2 . 5  
94 . 4  
9 9 . 7  
1 06 . 6 
1 1 2 . 7  
1 1 6 . 8 
1 3 0 . 9  
1 49 . 6  
1 5 3 . 7  
1 8 7 . 8 
1 9 3 . 7  
1 88 . 4  
2 0 8 . 6  
2 3 2 . 2  
2 6 4 . 9  
- 2 8 1 . 0  
300 . 0  
3 5 7 . 8 
4 3 2 . 1  
4 9 7 . 6  
540 . 7  
628 . 2  
N r e  x f  
(Tn" b f  1 1 i 1Jns o f  
U . S .  do l l ar s ) 
1 02 . 6  8 . 4 
1 3 7 . 7  1 0 . 5  
1 6 9  . 1  1 3 . 9 
1 8 1  . 9  2 4 . 3  
1 80 . 6  2 5 . 0  
1 7 8 . 3 2 2 . 0  
1 94 . 6 1 9 . 7  
2 1 9 . 0 1 9 . 0 
2 1 2 . i  1 8 . 5 
2 3 6 . 2  1 6 . 7  
2 7 2 . 3  1 8 . 9 
2 8 5 . 8  2 3 . 1  
2 9 9 . 7  2 3 . 2  
2 99 . 1 2 3 . 2  
3 2 8 . 0  2 0 . 0  
3 4 6 . 9  2 1 . 4  
3 6 2 . 3  2 2  . o  
3 6 4 . 0  2 1 . 9  
3 9 7 . 1  2 0 . 0  
4 1 2 . 0 2 2 . 4  
4 2 4 . 2 2 2 . 5  
4 5 7 . 4  2 1 . 8  
482 . 8  2 2  . 1  
5 1 9 . 2  2 1 . 7 
5 6 6 . 0  2 0 . 6  
6 2 2 . 2  2 1 . 0 
6 5 5 . 8  2 2 . 8  
7 1 4 . 4 2 4 . 5  
7 6 7 . 9 2 4 . 5  
798 . 4  2 4 . 3  
8 5 8 . 1  2 2 . 0  
9 5 1 . 9 2 1 . 9  
1 , 0 6 4 . 5  2 1 . 8  
1 , 1 3 6 . 0 2 3 . 3  
1 , 2 1 5  . o  2 3 .  1 
1 . 3 5 9 . 2  2 2  . 1  
1 , 5 1 5 . 3  2 3 . 6  
1 , 7 2 4 . 3  2 5 . 1 
1 , 9 2 4 . 8  2 5 . 9 
2 , 1 1 7 . 1  2 5 . 5  
2 , 3 5 2 . 5  2 6 . 7  
G9 Hh z i  
0 . 0 o . o 
o . o  o . o  
o . o o . o  
1 . 0 1 . 0  
1 . 0 1 . 0 
0 . 0  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 
o . o o . o 
0 . 0  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o  1 . 0 
o . o 1 . 0 6 2 . 7  
o . o  1 . 0 3 9 . � 
o . o 1 . 0 1 2 2 . I)  
0 . 0 1 . 0 2 7 5 . 5  
1 . 0 1 . 0 2 9 . 9  
1 . 0 1 . 0 2 9 9 . 4 
1 . 0 1 . 0 7 9 . 4  
o . o  1 . 0 - 3 4 . 5  
o . o 1 . 0 98 . 1  
0 . 0 1 . 0 9 7  . 1  
0 . 0 1 . 0 2 0 3 . 8  
o . o  1 . 0 8 7 . 2  
0 . 0  1 . 0 6 0 . 3  
0 . 0 1 . 0 1 6 5 . 5 
l . O 1 . 0 1 5 2 . 3  
1 . 0 1 . 0 1 2 9 . 7  
1 . 0 1 . 0 8 6 . 3 
1 . 0 1 . 0 1 46 . 8 
a
E c o noni c Repo r t  o f  t h e  ? r es i d e n t  1 9 8 2  ( l :a s h i n � t o n , D . C . : 
U . S . Go ve-rn Me n t  P r i n t in g  O f f i c e ) , P r> · 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 .  
b 
Ca l c u l a t e d  as ( [ C P I  - C P I  1 J t t - / C P I  1 ) x l O C> . t -
C Ca l c u l a t e d  ( [ I : lF  - n;F l 1 t t - / I N F  1 ) x 100 . t -
d E c o no m i c  Re p o r t o f  t h e  P re s i de n t  1 9 8 2  ( Uas h i n � t o n , D . C . : 
U . S . Gove rnme n t  P r i n t in r,  O f f i c e ) , � ·  2 4 3 , Tab le B- 7 3 .  
e E c o no m i c  Re p o r t  o f  t h e  P r es i d e n t  1 9 8 2  ( � :a s h i n � t on , D .  C . : 
U . S .  Go ve r nMen t  ? r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ) , , .  1 % ,  Tab l e  B- 2 1 .  
f Ca l c u l a t e d a s  (':.'P../ : < I ) x 100 . 
(Y 
"D umm�' va r i a b l e  fo r 2 5  p e r c e n t  ra t i o .  
h D umrny v a r i ab l e f o r  1 9  p e r c e n t ra t i o . 
j C a l c u l a t e d  a s  e q ua t i on ( 1 3 ) C h a p t e r  I I I  o f  t !l i s  s t udy . 
6 1  
Y ear 
1 9 6 3 
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 70 
1 9 7 1 
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
1 9 7 5  
1 9 76 
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 80 
CPI 
a 
19 75= 100 
56 . 0  
5 7 . 0  
5 8 . 0  
6 0 . 0  
6 3 . 0  
6 5 . 0  
6 7  . o  
70 . 0  
7 2 . 0  
7 5 . 0  
8 1 . 0  
90 . 0  
100 . 0  
108 . 0  
1 1 6 . 0  
1 2 6  . o  
1 38 . 0  
INF
b 
1 . 8  
1 .  7 
3 . 4  
5 . 0  
3 . 2  
3 . 1 
4 . 5  
2 . 9  
4 . 2 
8 . 0  
1 1 . 1 
1 1 .  l 
8 . 0  
7 . 4  
8 . 6  
9 . 5h 
8 . 7 
CANADA 
RIA
c 
o . o  
- 1 . 8  
9 6 . 6  
4 5 . 0  
- 36 . 5  
- 3 . l 
45 . 5  
- 36 . 2  
4 5 . 8  
9 2 . 0  
38 . 9  
o . o  
- 2 8 . 0  
- 7 . 4  
1 6 . 4  
10 . 5  
-8 . 7  
TR
d 
Ni
e 
( in b i l lions o f  
Canadian do l lars ) 
1 2 . 0  
1 4 . 0  
1 6 . 0 
1 8 . 0  
2 1 . 0  
2 4 . 0  
2 8 . 0  
30 . 0  
34 . 0  
38 . 0  
44 . 0  
5 6 . 0  
6 1 . 0  
70 . 0  
7 7 . 0  
8 5 . 0  
9 6 . 0  
1 1 0 . 0  
4 0 . 0  
4 3 . 0  
4 8 . 0  
5 3 . 0  
5 8 . 0 
6 3 . 0  
70 . 0  
7 5 . 0  
8 2 . 0  
9 3 . 0  
1 09 . 0  
1 3 1 . 0  
1 46 . 0  
1 69 . 0  
1 8 3 . 0 
2 0 1 . 0  
2 3 1 . 0  
2 5 5 . 0  
x
f 
30 . 0  
32 . 5  
3 3 . 3 
3 3 . 9 
36 . 2  
38 . 0  
40 . 0  
40 . 0  
4 1 . 4  
40 . 8  
40 . 3  
4 2 . 7  
4 1 . 7  
4 1 . 4  
42 . 0  
4 1 . 8  
4 1 . 5  
4 3 . 1 
aS ourc e : His torical S tat i s t i cs 1 9 6 0- 1 9 7 9 : Main Economic 
Indicators . Organi zat ion for Economic Coopera t ion and Deve lopment 
(Paris , France , 1 9 8 0 ) , p .  34 . 
b 
c 
Calculat ed a s  ( [ CPi t 
- CPI 1 J / CPI 1)  x 1 0 0 . t - t-
Calcula t ed as ( [INF - INF 1
J / INF 
1 ) x 1 00 . t t- t-
6 2  
z g 
2 2 2 . 2
1 2 2 . 9  
1 2 0 . 0
1 7 6 . 7 
1 6 5 . 7
1 5 0 . 0  
1 00 . 0
1 4 2 . 9
8 7 . 7 
9 1 . 8
1 35 . 1 
7 8 . 0
9 3 .  7 
1 2 0 . 7
9 5 . 1
9 3 . 8 
1 40 . 4
dOrganizat ion for Economic Cooperat ion and Development Nat ional 
Accounts 1 9 6 3- 1 9 8 0  (Paris , France , 1 9 8 2 ) , p .  1 4 7 , Tab l e  9 ,  line 1 2 . 
elbid . , p .  146 , Tab l e  6 ,  line 7 .  
f 
Calcula t ed as ( TR/NI ) x 1 0 0 . 
g
Calculated as equa t ion ( 1 3 )  Chapt er 3 o f  this s t udy . 
h
From the Organizat ion f o r  Economic Coop era t ion and Deve lopment , 
Finland , an Economic Survey 1 9 8 2 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 , World S urvey Tab l e ,  line 10 . 
Y ear 
1 9 6 3 
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 70  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
19 7 5  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 80 
INF
a 
5 . 2  
9 . 9  
5 . 2  
3 . 9  
5 . 6  
8 . 4  
2 . 4  
2 . 7 
6 . 5  
7 . 1 
1 2  . o  
1 6 . 2  
1 7 . 9 
1 4 . 4  
1 2 . 7  
7 . 6  
7 . 3  
1 0 .  7 
RIAb 
9 0 . 3  
-4 7 . 4  
- 2 5 . 0  
3 3 . 3 
6 1 . 5  
- 7 1 . 4  
1 2 . 5  
1 40 . 7  
9 . 2  
89 . 0  
3 3 . 3 
1 2 . 5 
- 2 2 . 2  
- 7 . 1 4  
-4 1 . 5  
5 . 2  
3 3 . 7 
FINLAUD* 
TR
c 
Ni
d 
( in b il lions 
of markkaa) 
6 . 2  
7 . 3  
8 . 4  
9 . 3  
1 0 . 8 
1 2 . 4  
1 3 . 8  
1 5 . 6  
1 7 . 9  
2 0 . 8  
2 5 . 7 
32 . 3  
39 . 4  
4 8 . 6  
5 2 . 8  
5 5 . 3  
6 1 . 5  
70 . 5  
1 8 . 0  
20 . 4  
2 2 . 6  
2 4 . 3  
2 6 . 7  
30 . 5  
34 . 5  
38 . 3  
4 2 . 4  
4 9 . 6  
6 0 . 2 
7 5 . 5  
8 7 . 7 
9 9 . 3  
109 . 0  
1 1 9 . 4  
1 3 7 . 7  
1 58 . 3  
X
e 
34 . 4  
35 . 7  
3 7 . 1  
3 8 . 2 
40 . 0  
4 0 . 4 
40 . 0  
4 0 . 7  
4 2 . 4  
4 1 .  9 
4 2 . 6  
4 2 . 7  
4 4 . 8  
4 8 . 9  
48 . 4  
46 . 3  
44 . 6  
4 4 . 5  
z f 
4 4 1 . 0  
3 6 4 . 2  
4 2 1 . 5 
2 3 5 . 8  
2 , 000 . 0  
- 84 1 .  6 
8 79 . 1 
4 7 8 . 8  
9 4 2 . 2  
1 , 4 9 6 . 4  
1 1 , 9 2 7 . 3  
9 , 34 1 . 4 
1 6 1 .  9 
- 89 7 . 5  
- 5 . 8  
6 3  
. 0 7 
-6 , 5 7 9 . 9  
a
Organi zat ion for Economic Coop erat ion and Deve lopment 
Finland from the Economic Survey S e ries (Paris , Franc e) , various is sues , 
l is t ed as "per c entage in CPI . " 
b 
Calcu la t ed a s  ( INF - INF 1 ) / ( INF 1 ) x 1 0 0 . t t- t-
COrgani zat ion for Economic Cooperation and Development Na t ional 
Accounts  1 9 6 3- 1 9 8 0  (Paris , France , 1 9 80 ) , p . 1 4 7 , Tab le 9 ,  line 1 2 . 
dib id . , p .  1 4 6 , Tab le 6 ,  line 7 .  
e Calculat ed a s ( TR/NI ) x 100 . 
f
Calcu la t e d  as equat ion ( 1 3 )  Chap t er 3 o f  this s tudy . 
* 
CP I dat a was not availab le in a cont inuo us form for Finland . 
There fore , o f ficial rat e o f  inf lation was us ed in the analys is and the CPI 
is not li s t ed . 
Year 
19 6 3  
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
19 70  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
19 7 3  
19 74 
1 9 7 5  
19 7 6  
19 7 7  
1 9 78  
19 79 
1 9 80 
CPI 
a INFb 
1 9 7 5= 1 00 
5 0 . 0  
5 1 . 7  
5 3 . 0  
5 4 . 4  
5 5 . 9  
5 8 . 4  
6 2 . 2  
6 5 . 5  
6 9 . 0  
7 3 . 7 
78 . 7  
89 . 5  
100 . 0  
109 . 6  
1 1 9 . 9  
1 30 . 8  
1 44 . 8  
4 . 8 
3 . 4  
2 . 5  
2 . 6  
2 . 7 
4 . 4  
6 . 5  
5 . 3  
5 . 3  
6 . 8  
6 . 7 
1 3 .  7 
1 1 .  7 
9 . 6  
1 0 . 0  
9 . 0  
1 0 . 7h 1 0 . 5  
FRANCE 
RIAc 
-29 . 1 0 
- 2 6 . 4  
4 . 00 
3 . 8  
6 2 . 9  
4 7 . 7  
- 1 8 . 4  
0 . 0  
2 8 . 3 
o . o  
1 0 1 . 4  
- 1 4 . 5  
- 1 7 . 9  
4 . 1 
- 10 . 0  
1 8 . 8  
- 1 . 8  
TRd Ni
e 
( in b i l lions 
of francs )  
1 5Q . O  
1 7 . 0  
1 85 . 7 
2 00 . 7 
2 1 6 . 1  
2 3 8 . 1 
2 7 8 . 7  
30 5 . 0  
3 3 3 . 9  
35 7 . 1  
4 30 . 0  
50 3 . 8  
5 8 7 . 1 
7 1 3 . 3 
7 9 8 . 8  
30 5 . 2  
1 , 06 4 . 9  
1 , 2 5 1 . 2  
36 4 . 9  
40 5 . 3  
4 35 .  8 
4 7 1 . 1 
50 8 . 2  
5 5 3 . 2 
6 3 1 . 8  
69 8 . 7 
78 5 . 7 
8 82 . 9  
99 9 . 3  
1 , 1 35 . 6  
1 , 2 84 . 0  
1 , 4 7 4 . 4  
1 , 6 6 5 . 1 
1 , 89 2 . 5 
2 , 1 6 3 . 8 
2 , 4 5 0 . 3  
xf 
4 1 . 4  
4 2 . 1 
42 . 6  
42 . 6  
42 . 5  
4 3 . 0 
44 . 1 1 
4 3 . 6 
4 2 . 4  
4 2 . 4  
4 3 . 0 
44 . 3  
4 5 . 7  
48 . 3  
4 7 . 4  
4 7 . 8  
49 . 2  
5 1 . 0  
aS ource : His torical  S t a t i s t ics  1 9 6 0- 1 9 79 :  Main Economic 
Indi ca t o rs . Organizat ion for Economic Cooperat ion and Development 
( Paris , France , 1 9 8 0 ) , p .  2 9 6 . 
b 
c 
Calculat ed as ( [ CPI - CPI 1 1 
/ CPI 
1
) x 100 . 
t t- t -
Calculat ed as ( [ INF - INF 
1
1 / INF 
1
) x 1 00 . t t- t-
64 
z g 
1 1 8 .  3 
11 9 . 1  
9 7 . 9  
10 1 . 8  
1 1 4 . 9 
1 1 9 . 1 
9 1 .  4 
7 3 . 6 
1 0 2 . 0  
1 1 0 . 5  
1 2 4 . 7 
1 2 7 . 2  
1 4 5 . 0  
9 2 . 0  
9 8 . 3 
1 2 2 . 6  
1 3 2 . 4  
d
Organizat ion for  E conomic Cooperation and Development Nat i onal 
Account s 1 9 6 3- 1 980 (Paris , France ,  1 9 8 2 ) , p .  10 1 ,  Tab le 9 ,  line 1 2 . 
e ib id . , p .  1 0 1 ,  Tab l e  6 ,  l ine 7 .  
f 
Calculat ed as ( TR/NI ) x 100 . 
g
Calculated as  equa t ion ( 1 3) Chap t e r  3 o f  this s t udy . 
h
From �he Organizat ion for E conomi c Cooperat ion and Deve lopment 
Finland , an Economi c Survey 1 9 8 2 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 ,  Wor ld S urvey Tab le , line 10 . 
Y ear 
1 9 6 3  
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7  
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 70  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
1 9 7 5  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 80 
CPI 
a INFb 
1 9 7 5 = 1 0 0  
6 1 . 7 
6 3 . 1 
6 5 . 3  
6 7 . 5  
6 8 . 5  
70 . 5  
7 1 . 8  
74 . 2  
78 . 2  
8 2 . 5  
88 . 2  
9 4 . 4 
100 . 0  
104 . 5  
108 . 4  
l l l .  3 
l l 5 . 9  
3 . 0  
2 . 2  
3 . 4  
3 . 3 
1 . 4  
2 . 9  
1 . 8 
3 . 3 
5 . 3  
5 . 4  
6 . 9  
7 . 0  
5 . 9  
4 . 5 
3 . 7  
2 . 6 
4 .  lh 
5 . 5  
GERMANY 
RI C
c 
- 2 6 . 6  
5 4 . 4  
- 2 . 9  
- 5 7 . 5  
1 0 7  . 1  
- 3 7  . 9  
8 3 . 3 
60 . 6  
1 . 8  
2 7 . 7 
1 . 4  
- 1 5 . 7 
- 2 3 . 7 
- 1 7 . 7  
-2 9 . 7  
5 7 . 6  
34 . 1  
TRd Ni
e 
( in b i l lions 
o f  marks ) 
1 39 . 4  
1 5 1 . 4  
1 6 2 . 2 
1 7 5 . 1 
1 79 . 5  
1 9 4 . 0  
2 2 8 . 4  
2 54 . 2  
2 88 . 9  
32 0 . 1 
3 7 8 . 7 
4 0 9 . 8  
4 2 1 .  7 
4 7 4 . 7 
5 2 2 . 0  
5 5 6 . 8  
5 9 7 . 8 
6 3 7 . 8  
3 4 7 . 1 
380 . 6  
4 1 4 . 8  
4 39 . 6  
44 3 . 1 
48 1 . 8  
5 39 . 5  
6 1 0 . 6 
6 7 7 . 5  
740 . 8  
8 24 . 0  
8 76 . 6  
9 1 7 . 8  
9 9 9 . 5  
1 , 06 6 . 3  
1 , 1 4 5 . 9  
1 , 2 39 . 8  
1 , 3 1 6 . 0  
x
f 
40 . 1  
39 . 7  
39 . 1 
40 . 5  
40 . 2  
4 2 . 3  
4 1 . 6  
4 2 . 6  
4 3 . 2 
4 5 . 9  
46 . 7  
4 5 . 9  
4 7 . 4  
48 . 9  
48 . 5  
4 8 . 2  
48 . 2  
48 . 4  
a
Source : His torical S ta t i s t i c s  1 96 0- 1 9 79 : Main Economic 
Indicators . Organizat ion f o r  Economic Cooperat ion and Deve lopment 
(Paris , France ,  1 9 80 ) , p .  34 1 .  
b 
Calcula t ed as ( [ CPI - CPI 1
1 / CPI 1 )  x 1 00 .  
t t- t -
CCalcula ted  as  ( [ INF - INF 1
1 I INF 
1
) x 1 00 .  
t t- t -
6 5  
z g 
90 . 7  
8 1 . 4  
1 32 . 8  
2 50 . 8  
9 7 . 6  
1 4 5 . 3  
86 . 5 
1 2 1 .  8 
l l 9 . 4  
1 5 9 . 6  
1 2 9 . 9 
6 2 . 6  
1 40 . 7 
1 50 . 9  
8 7 . 8  
89 . 8  
1 0 7 . 8  
dOrganizat ion for  Ec onomic Co op erat i on and Deve lopment Nat ional 
Accounts 1 9 6 3- 1 9 80 (Paris , Franc e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p .  1 1 1 ,  Tab l e  9 ,  line 1 2 .  
eib id . , p .  1 1 0 ,  Tab le 6 ,  line 7 .  
f Calculat ed as ( TR/NI)  x 1 0 0 . 
g
Ca lculated as equat ion ( 1 3) Chapt e r  3 o f  this s tudy . 
h
From the Organizat ion for  Economic Coop e rat ion and Deve lopment 
Finland , an Edonomic Survey 19 82 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 . Wo rld S urvey Tab le ,  l ine 10 . 
Y ear 
1 9 6 3  
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 7 0 
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
1 9 7 5  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 8 0  
CPI 
a 
INFb 
1 9 7 5= 10 0  
46 . 4  
4 9 . 2  
5 1 . 3 
5 2 . 3  
5 3 . 4  
5 4 . 0  
5 5 . 6  
5 8 . 4  
6 1 . 3  
6 4 . 7 
7 1 . 5  
8 5 . 4  
1 0 0 . 0  
1 16 . 5  
1 39 . 0  
1 56 . 3  
1 80 . 9  
7 . 4  
6 . 0  
4 . 2  
1 . 9 
2 . 1  
1 . 1 
2 . 9  
5 . 0  
4 . 9  
5 . 5  
1 1 . 0  
1 9 . 4  
1 7 . 0  
1 6 . 5  
1 9 . 3  
1 2 . 4  
1 5 . lh 
1 6 . 6  
ITALY 
RIAc 
- 1 8 . 9  
- 30 . 0  
- 5 4 . 7 
1 0 . 5 
- 4 7 . 6  
1 6 3 . 6  
72 . 4  
-2 . 0  
1 2 . 2  
100 . 0  
7 6 . 3  
- 1 2 . 3 
-2 . 9  
1 6 . 9  
- 35 . 7 
2 1 .  7 
9 . 9  
TRd Ni
e 
( in b il l ions 
of lira) 
9 . 8  
1 1 . 1 
1 1 .  7 
1 2 . 7 
1 4 . 4 
1 5 . 9  
1 7 . 1 
1 9 . 1  
2 1 . 2  
2 3 . 1 
2 7 . 3  
3 3 . 8  
3 9 . 1  
5 1 . 5  
6 5 . 1 
80 . 1  
9 6 . 3  
1 2 6 . 6  
30 . 8  
3 3 . 5  
36 . 2  
39 . 3  
4 3 . 4 
4 7 . 1 
5 2 . 0  
5 8 . 1 
6 3 . 4  
6 9 . 5  
8 2 . 5  
1 00 . 0  
1 1 2 . 1 
1 40 . 4  
1 70 . 3  
1 9 9 . 4  
2 4 4 . 0  
305 . 8  
x
f 
3 1 . 8  
3 3 . 1 
32 . 3 
32 . 3 
33 . l  
3 3 . 7 
3 2 . 8  
32 . 8  
3 3 . 4  
3 3 . 2  
3 3 . 0 
3 3 . 6  
34 . 8  
36 . 6  
38 . 2  
40 . l  
39 . 4  
4 1 . 3  
a
S o urce : Hist orical S t a t i s t ics  1 9 6 0- 1 9 7 9 : Main Economic 
Indicators . Organizat ion for Ec onomic Cooperat ion and D evelopment 
(Paris , France , 1 980 ) , p .  4 5 . 
b Calculated a s  ( [ CPI - CPI 1 ] / CPI 1 ) x 1 0 0 . t t - t -
CCa lculated a s  ( [ INF - INF 1J . / INF 1 ) x 1 0 0 . t t- t-
6 6  
zg 
1 2 2 . 4  
6 9 . 9  
102 . 5  
1 30 . 5  
1 1 1 . 9  
70 . 9  
1 0 1 . 3  
1 2 7 .  5 
94 . 1  
96 . 5  
1 08 . 4  
1 30 . 6  
1 2 6 . 8  
1 2 3 . 9  
5 85 . 3  
4 2 5 . 4  
1 2 5 . 8  
d
Organizat ion for Economic Cooperat ion and Development Nat ional 
Account s 1 9 6 3- 1 980 (Paris , Franc e ,  1 9 8 2 ) , p .  1 4 7 , Tab l e  9 ,  line 1 2 . 
e
ibid . , p .  1 4 6 , Tab le 6 ,  l ine 7 .  
f 
Calcula t ed as (TR/NI)  x 100 . 
g
Calcuiated as equa t ion ( 1 3) Chap ter 3 o f  this s tudy . 
h
From the Organizat ion for Economic Cooperat ion and Development 
Fin land , an Economi c S urvey 1 9 8 2 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 , World S urvey Table , line 1 0 . 
Y ear 
1 9 6 3  
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 7 0  
1 9 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
1 9 7 5  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 80 
CPI a 
1 9 75= 100  
5 4 . 7  
5 6 . 3  
5 8 . 3 
6 1 . 0  
6 3 . 5 
6 5 . 0  
6 6 . 7  
6 9 . 1  
7 3 . 6 
7 8 . 5  
85 . 4  
9 3 . 7 
100 . 0  
1 0 1 .  7 
1 0 3 . 0  
1 04 . 0  
1 0 7 . 9  
INF
b 
3 . 5 
2 . 9  
3 . 5  
4 . 6  
4 . 0  
2 . 3 
2 . 6  
3 . 5  
6 . 5  
6 . 6  
8 . 7 
9 . 7  
6 . 7  
1 . 7 
1 . 2  
1 . 0 
3 . 6h 2 . 3 
SWITZERLAND 
RIA
c 
- 1 7 . 1 
2 0 . 6  
3 1 .  4 
- 1 3 . 0  
- 4 2 . 5  
1 3 . 0  
34 . 6  
8 5 . 7  
1 . 5  
3 1 . 8  
1 1 . 9  
- 30 . 9  
- 74 . 4  
- 88 . 3  
-400 . 0  
2 6 0 . 0  
- 1 6 . 6  
TRd Ni
e 
( in b i ll ions 
of f rancs )  
1 1 . 8  
1 3 . 4  
1 4 . 1 
1 5 . 7 
1 7 . 0  
1 9 . 0  
2 1 . 4  
24 . 0  
2 7 . 0  
30 . 8  
3 7 . 5  
4 1 . 8  
44 . 9  
48 . 1 
49 . 1  
5 1 . 2  
5 2 . 4  
5 5 . 9  
4 7 . 0  
5 1 . 9  
5 5 . 6  
5 9 . 7 
6 4 . 3  
6 8 . 8  
7 4 . 6  
8 3 . 1 
9 4 . 2  
106 . 4  
1 1 9 . 2  
1 30 . 2  
1 2 9 . 3  
1 32 . 2  
1 35 . 9  
1 4 1 . 0 
1 48 . 4  
1 5 8 . 9  
x
f 
2 5 . 1  
2 5 . 8  
2 5 . 3  
2 6 . 2  
26 . 4  
2 7 . 6  
2 8 . 6  
2 8 . 8  
2 8 . 6 
2 8 . 9  
3 1 . 4  
32 . 1  
34 . 7  
36 . 3  
36 . 1  
36 . 3  
35 . 3  
35 . l 
aS ource : Historical S t a t i s t ics 1 9 6 0- 1 9 7 9 : Main Economic 
Indicato rs . Organizat ion for  Economic Coop eration and Development 
(Paris , France ,  1 9 8 0 ) , p .  5 5 7 .  
b 
c 
Calculated a s  ( [ CP I - CP I 1 ] / CPI 1 ) x 100 . t t- t-
Calculat ed as ( [ INF - INF 1
] / INF 
1
) x 1 00 . t t- t-
6 7  
zg 
1 70 . 9  
1 00 . 0  
2 66 . 6  
7 3 .  7 
1 88 . 2  
1 9 9 . 2 
1 1 7 . 4  
9 4 . 3  
8 7 . 0  
190 . 2 
1 1 6 . 9  
-9 5 1 . 2  
390 . 9  
9 1 . 6  
9 1 . 8  
39 . 4  
1 1 3 . 8  
d
Organizat ion for Economic Cooperat ion and D evelopment Nat ional . -
Accounts  1 9 6 3- 1 980  (Paris , Franc e ,  1 9 8 2 ) , p .  2 1 7 ,  Tab l e  9 ,  line 1 2 . 
eib id . , p .  2 1 6 ,  Tab l e  6 , l ine 7 .  
f - calculat ed as ( TR/NI ) x 100 . 
g
Calcula t ed as  equat ion ( 1 3)  Chap ter 3 o f  this s t udy . 
h
From the Organi zat ion f o r  Economic Cooperation and Deve lopment 
Finland , a n  Economic Survey 1 9 8 2 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 , World Survey Tab l e , line 10 . 
Year 
1 9 6 3  
1 9 6 4  
1 9 6 5  
1 9 6 6  
1 9 6 7 
1 9 6 8  
1 9 6 9  
1 9 70 
19 7 1  
1 9 7 2  
1 9 7 3  
1 9 7 4  
1 9 7 5  
1 9 7 6  
1 9 7 7  
1 9 7 8  
1 9 7 9  
1 9 80 
CPI 
a 
INFb 
1 9 7 5= 10 0  
4 0 . 4  
4 2 . 0  
4 4 . 0  
4 5 . 6  
4 6 . 7  
4 8 . 9  
5 1 . 5  
5 4 . 8  
6 0 . 0  
6 4 . 1  
6 9 . 5  
80 . 5 
1 00 . 0  
1 1 5 . 8  
1 34 . 3 
1 4 6 . 4 
1 6 5 . 9  
1 . 7  
3 . 9 
4 . 7 
3 . 6 
2 . 4  
4 . 7 
5 . 3  
6 . 4  
9 . 4  
6 . 8  
8 . 4  
1 5 . 8  
2 4 . 2  
1 5 . 8  
1 5 . 9  
9 . 0 
1 3 . 3h 
1 4 . 4  
UNITED KINGDOM 
RIA
c 
1 2 3 . 5 
1 8 . 4  
- 2 2 . 2  
- 34 . 2  
9 5 . 6  
1 1 .  l 
20 . 0  
4 3 . 3 
- 2 5 . 5  
20 . 3  
7 6 . 6  
4 3 . 3 
- 30 . 2  
1 . 4  
-42 . 7  
48 . l 
2 3 . l  
TR
d 
Ni
e 
( in billions 
of pounds)  
9 . 6 
1 0 . 4 
1 1 . 8  
1 3 . l 
1 4 . 6  
1 6 . 4 
1 8 . 4  
2 0 . 7 
2 2 . 0  
2 3 . 3 
26 . 4  
3 3 . 2  
4 2 . 5  
4 9 . 5  
56 . 4  
6 2 . 7  
7 4 . 9  
9 1 . 3  
2 8 . 0  
30 . 5  
32 . 8  
34 . 8  
36 . 7  
39 . 7  
4 2 . 5  
46 . 6  
5 2 . l  
5 7 . 4  
6 6 . 0  
74 . 6  
9 3 . 0  
1 10 . 1 
1 26 . 3  
1 4 4 . 0  
1 6 8 . 8  
1 9 6 . 9  
x
f 
34 . 2  
34 . 1  
35 . 9  
3 7 . 6  
39 . 7 
4 1 . 3  
4 3 . 2  
44 . 4  
4 2 . 2  
4 0 . 6  
4 0 . 0  
44 . 5  
4 8 . 6  
44 . 9  
44 . 6  
4 3 . 5 
4 4 . 3  
4 6 . 3  
aSour c e : His t orical Statistics  1 9 6 0- 1 9 7 9 : Main Economic 
Indica t o rs . Organiz�t ion for Economic Cooperation and D evelopment 
(Paris , Franc e , 1 9 80 ) , p . 6 0 6 . 
b 
c 
Calcula t ed as ( [CPI - CPI 1
] / CPI 1
) x 1 0 0 . 
t t- t-
Calcula t ed as ( [INF - INF 1
] / INF 1
) x 100 . 
t t- t-
6 8 
z
g 
1 5 5 . 5  
100 . 0  
300 . 0  
1 34 . 6  
1 7 6 . l 
2 50 . 0  
9 3 . 3 
9 4 . 0  
4 7 . 2  
8 2 . 6  
1 9 7 . 4  
1 1 3 . 6  
9 1 . l 
9 8 . 2  
7 5 . 0  
1 1 6 .  l 
1 3 3 . 0  
d
Organizat ion for  Economic Cooperation and Development National 
Ac coun t s  1 9 6 3- 19 80 (Paris , Franc e , 1 9 8 2 ) , p .  2 35 ,  Tab le 9 ,  line 1 2 . 
eibid . , p .  2 35 ,  Table 7 ,  line 7 .  
f Calcula t ed a s  ( TR/NI) x 100 . 
g
Calculat ed a s  equa tion ( 1 3) Chap ter 3 o f  this s t udy . 
h
From the O rgani zation for Economic Cooperat ion and Deve lopment 
Finland , an Economic S urvey 1 9 8 2 , pp . 1 5- 1 6 , Wo rld S urvey Tab l e ,  line 1 0 . 
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